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1Chapter 1 Introduction
Over the last several years, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have
become the predominant tool of modern macroeconomics and, in particular, monetary policy
research. In general, the baseline New Keynesian framework has emerged as “the workhorse
for the analysis of monetary policy, fluctuations, and welfare” (Gali [2008]: 41).1 This
framework uses optimizing agents and firms to generate a dynamic, rational expectations
model analogous to traditional IS-LM analysis in which the LM curve has been replaced with
a monetary policy rule. As a result, the New Keynesian framework, even when extended to
include capital accumulation, assumes that the traditional interest rate channel is the sole
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.2
The importance assigned to the interest rate in monetary policy transmission is consistent
with neoclassical economic theory. For example, changes in the interest rate should result
in intertemporal substitution of consumption as a higher real interest rate should result in
lower consumption in the present period. In addition, the permanent income or life-cycle
hypothesis suggests that higher real interest rates reduce the demand for assets thereby
resulting in lower prices, a decline in wealth, and a corresponding decline in consumption.
Finally, consistent with the neoclassical theory of investment, an increase in the real interest
rate causes an increase in the user cost of capital and a corresponding reduction in investment.
Exclusive emphasis on the short term interest rate necessarily downplays the role for
monetary aggregates. In fact, in most cases, money is excluded from the model altogether.
This exclusion is the result of an emerging consensus in the literature that money aggregates
can be altogether ignored without the loss of significant information. The justification for
this consensus is based on four factors. First, the Federal Reserve and other central banks
around the world use an interest rate as their monetary policy instrument. As such it is not
1For examples of monetary policy analysis using the baseline New Keynesian model, see Clarida et al.
[1999], Clarida et al. [2000], and Rotemberg and Woodford [1997].
2For an overview of the New Keynesian framework, see Clarida et al. [1999], Ch. 3 in Woodford [2003],
Walsh [2003], or Gali [2008].
2clear a priori whether money aggregates provide additional information not communicated
by movements in the interest rate. Second, there is a widespread belief that the demand
for money is unstable (Friedman and Kuttner [1992]; Estrella and Mishkin [1997]; Wood-
ford [1998]) and as a result money aggregates do not have a predictable influence on other
economic variables. Third, empirical estimation of backward-looking IS equations do not
find a statistically significant relationship between real money balances and the output gap
(Rudebusch and Svensson [2002]). Finally, the dynamic New Keynesian model abstracts
from money completely based on the claim that money is redundant in the model.3 In fact,
McCallum [2001a] notes that the quantitative implications of this omission are quite small.
Nevertheless, there remains reason for skepticism about the strong assumptions regard-
ing the role of money and the transmission of monetary policy. For example, the idea that
the interest rate is sufficient for describing the monetary transmission process has long been
questioned. Two predominant critiques, and those directly addressed in this paper, are those
levied by monetarists and those who advocate the credit view.4 For example, monetarists
often emphasized the nature of relative price adjustment for a multitude of assets, of which
the interest rate is the price of only one such asset (Cf. Friedman and Schwartz [1963];
Brunner and Meltzer [1963]; Laidler [1982]). In fact, the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary shocks was often the primary grounds for criticism of the traditional IS-LM model
among monetarists (Brunner and Meltzer [1976], Brunner and Meltzer [1993]). In addition,
advocates of the credit channel of monetary transmission argue that the interest rate alone
is insufficient for describing the transmission process and emphasize the role of net worth
(Gertler and Gilchrist [1993]; Bernanke and Gertler [1995]).
Also, while the empirical research cited above casts doubts on the role of money serving
as either an information variable or an intermediate target for monetary policy, this evidence
3For a textbook treatment, see Woodford [2003] or Gali [2008].
4There are certainly other channels of policy transmission emphasized in the literature, most notably
Tobin’s q and the exchange rate channel. These are not discussed in this paper as the baseline New Keynesian
model assumes that the capital stock is fixed – as in the traditional IS-LM model – and, while the framework
can be extended to the open economy, using a closed economy approach seems reasonable for the analysis
of a large, open economy such as the United States.
3is potentially flawed by the use of simple sum money aggregates. The use of simple sum
aggregates is problematic because this aggregation procedure is only valid in the case in
which all money assets in the particular aggregate are perfect substitutes. This limiting case
is not supported empirically.
An alternative to the simple sum aggregates is the monetary services index, first derived
by Barnett [1980] and available through the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database.5
The advantage of using the monetary services index is that the index is derived from mi-
crotheoretic foundations and is consistent with aggregation and index number theory.
The purpose of this dissertation is to re-examine the empirical results that justify the
exclusion of money from DSGE models as well as assess alternate assumptions about the
monetary transmission mechanism. This is accomplished as follows. First, the empirical
evidence that supports the exclusion of money is re-examined using the monetary services
indexes rather than simple sum aggregates as the measure of money. Second, the baseline
New Keynesian model is extended to include asset prices, net worth, and a richer specifi-
cation of the money demand function in order to compare and contrast the implications of
alternative assumptions regarding the monetary transmission mechanism. The dissertation
makes a significant contribution to the literature by demonstrating that the use of a more
theoretically sound measure of money provides empirical support for stable money demand
and the appearance of real money balances in the IS equation. In addition, the results from
the extension of the New Keynesian model suggest that the interest rate is not sufficient to
capture the monetary transmission mechanism.
5There exist corresponding indexes for M1, M2, M3, and MZM. The database also includes the currency
equivalent aggregates developed by Rotemberg et al. [1995]. These latter aggregates are not used in this
paper.
4Chapter 2 The New Keynesian Framework
As alluded to in the introduction, the basic New Keynesian model serves as the predom-
inant framework for monetary analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the New
Keynesian model and the implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. Section
2.1 introduces the basic New Keynesian model. Section 2.2 discusses two predominant, al-
ternative transmission mechanisms in the literature and section 2.3 discusses the empirical
evidence used to justify the assumptions of the New Keynesian model.
2.1 Theory
The baseline New Keynesian model consists of a representative household that chooses
consumption and labor to maximize utility, a sticky price firm, and a monetary authority
that sets the interest rate according to a monetary policy rule. The model can be summarized
by the following three equations:
y˜t = βEty˜t+1 − (1/σ)(Rt − Etpit+1) (1)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κy˜t (2)
Rt = φpipit + φy˜y˜t + 
R
t (3)
where y˜t is the output gap, Rt is the nominal interest rate, pit is inflation, and 
R
t is a
monetary policy shock. Equation (1) is a dynamic IS equation, equation (2) is the New
Keynesian Phillips curve, and equation (3) is the monetary policy rule. The framework
therefore resemble IS-LM analysis where the LM curve has been replaced by a monetary
policy rule that describes the path of the interest rate.6
When solved forward, the IS equation implies that the demand for the output good is a
6The model can easily be extended to include capital accumulation, but this adjustment does not effect
the monetary transmission mechanism.
5function of the expectation of the future real interest rate. Alternatively, when interpreted
in light of the expectations theory of the term structure, this implies that the output good
is a function of the long term real interest rate. A positive monetary policy shock reflected
in Rt increases the nominal interest rate and, because prices are sticky, the real interest rate.
In conjunction with the expectations theory of the term structure this implies that the long
term interest rate rises as well. The size of the response of output to a monetary policy
shock is then determined by the interest elasticity given in the IS equation.
This model therefore makes strong assumptions about the transmission of monetary
shocks. Namely, it assumes that monetary shocks are transmitted solely through a single
interest rate. Other asset prices are ignored. Given the implications of the model, it is
important to consider whether this claim is consistent with empirical evidence and to inves-
tigate how well this model can explain the properties of macroeconomic variables relative to
one in which the transmission mechanism is more richly specified. These topics make up the
remainder of the dissertation.
2.2 Alternative Mechanisms
2.2.1 The Monetarist Transmission Channel
Notably absent from the New Keynesian model is an explicit representation of money.
Whereas the traditional IS-LM model includes a money demand function, the New Keynesian
framework replaces money demand with an interest rate rule. Money demand can be modeled
explicitly, but movements in real balances simply reflect quantities necessary to clear the
market given the nominal interest rate and the level of output. As a result, money is
redundant and often excluded from the model.
The exclusion of money, or the cashless approach, is typically justified by the absence of a
meaningful real balance, or wealth effect, in the IS equation. For example, Woodford [2003]
shows that if real money balances are non-separable with consumption in the utility function,
real balances enter the structural IS equation, shown as equation (1) above. However, for
6reasonable parameterizations of the model the impact of real balances on demand is quite
small. A somewhat similar analysis is conducted by Ireland [2004] who develops a model in
which real money balances enter both the IS equation and the forward-looking Phillips curve
(equation 2 above). Estimation of the model suggests that real balances should be absent
from both equations. Similarly, McCallum [2001a] broadly concludes that the exclusion of
money does not greatly alter the results of a cashless model.
The exclusion of money is at odds with the role that money plays in the monetarist trans-
mission mechanism in which real money balances convey information about the transmission
process not captured by the interest rate. Whereas both traditional Keynesian and New Key-
nesian IS-LM-type analysis emphasizes the effect of monetary policy on ”the” interest rate
as a sufficient description of the transmission process, the monetarist approach puts empha-
sis on the idea that monetary shocks affect a number of asset prices and the corresponding
yields on that asset. For example, following an open market purchase, financial asset prices
increase and yields on such assets correspondingly decline. As these prices increase, they
become expensive relative to non-financial assets. Through attempts to reallocate portfolios,
this provides an incentive to increase the demand for nonfinancial assets. This increase in
the demand for nonfinancial assets, in turn, increases the price of existing assets relative
to newly produced assets, which provides the incentive for the purchase of newly produced
nonfinancial assets, such as capital. What’s more, the rising prices of nonfinancial assets
increases wealth and therefore the demand for newly produced goods and services. If the
money demand specification is such that real balances are a function of a number of asset
prices, as in Friedman [1956], and not a single short term interest rate, the behavior of real
balances will reflect the various portfolio reallocations and substitution effects induced by
the open market operation.
Thus, while the exclusion of money is justified, at least in part, by the absence of a
meaningful real balance effect, the monetarist transmission mechanism provides an alterna-
tive explanation for the role of money in the transmission process. Rather than describing a
7direct wealth effect from a change in real money balances as emphasized by Patinkin [1965],
the monetarist transmission mechanism emphasizes that changes in real balances are akin to
an index that reflects the relative price adjustments and corresponding changes in explicit
and implicit yields of a number of assets.7 Changes in real balances thus reflect substitution
rather than wealth effects. This distinction is important because it implies that real balances
can contain important information for explaining movements in aggregate demand without
the existence of a real balance effect and without a real balance term in the IS equation.
Finally, this channel can potentially explain the empirical significance of real money balances
for a variety of definitions of money found in estimated IS equations by Nelson [2002], Hafer
et al. [2007], and in Chapter 3.
2.2.2 The Credit Channel
Those who advocate the credit view similarly charge that the traditional interest rate
channel is insufficient to explain the real effects generated by monetary disturbances.8 How-
ever, the literature on the credit channel emphasizes the role of informational asymmetries
between borrowers and lenders. For example, the borrower often has better information
about the prospects of a particular project. As a result, the presence of imperfect informa-
tion drives a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance known as an external
finance premium that serves to compensate the lender for monitoring and assessing the
value of the project, or agency costs. What’s more, the existence of this premium implies
that informational asymmetries increase the cost of borrowing and therefore real economic
7This point should not be controversial. For example, the quintessential monetarist Milton Friedman
(1976: 317) wrote: “I have never myself thought that wealth effects of changes in the quantity of money,
or of prices changes which altered the real quantity of money, were of any empirical importance for short-
run economic fluctuations. I have always believed that substitution effects were the important way in which
changes in money exerted influence.” Friedman and other monetarists have very similar arguments elsewhere
as well [Nelson, 2003].
8The credit channel can actually be divided into two sub-channels. The first is the bank lending channel,
which emphasizes the role of bank balance sheets in amplifying the effects of monetary policy. The second
subgroup, which is described in this section, emphasizes the role external and internal finance in economic
decisions. The latter is what is explored in this paper and thus the discussion in this section neglects to
discuss the bank lending channel.
8decision-making.
As a result, the external finance premium is central to the monetary transmission mecha-
nism in the credit channel literature. Specifically, the external finance premium represents an
amplification mechanism following a monetary disturbance. For example, a change in mone-
tary policy that increases the interest rate simultaneously lowers the discounted present value
of assets. As a result, net worth and, correspondingly, collateral values decline. The decline
in net worth serves to increase the external finance premium and propagate the monetary
disturbance.9
The baseline New Keynesian model abstracts from information asymmetries and implic-
itly accepts the Modigliani and Miller [1958] Theorem under which the structure of the
financial system is irrelevant for analysis. While this characteristic is useful in cases in which
financial market frictions are small, empirical evidence suggests that net worth, cash flow,
and firm-specific measures of finance are important in the decision-making of firms.10
2.3 Evidence
It is by now a well-accepted axiom that a stable money demand function is a necessary
condition for money to exert a predictable influence on economic variables. What’s more,
there exists an emerging consensus in the literature that money demand has been unstable
since the beginning of the 1980s and that money is not useful as an information variable.
Indeed, this is a primary justification for the cashless approach outlined above. Specifically,
the work of Friedman and Kuttner [1992] and Estrella and Mishkin [1997] are often cited as
providing comprehensive evidence of this view. These results are discussed in turn below.
Friedman and Kuttner [1992] conduct a comprehensive analysis of money demand sta-
bility and the role of money as an information variable by employing two broad approaches.
First, they examine the role of money growth in influencing nominal income growth and
9Bernanke et al. [1996] refer to this propagation mechanism as the “financial accelerator.”
10Cf. Fazzari et al. [1988]; Cantor [1990]; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Cummins et al. [1994]; Himmelberg
and Peterson [1994]; Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995]; Hubbard et al. [1995]; Bernanke et al. [1996]; Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek [2007]).11
9inflation under the assumption that if money is useful as an information variable, it should
be the primary predictor of each. The second approach is to measure the stability of money
demand using a cointegrated vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. For each of their ap-
proaches, they estimate results for three samples, the first sample runs from 1960:2 - 1979:3,
the second from 1960:2 - 1990:4, and the final from 1970:3 - 1990:4.
In the first stage of analysis, the authors begin by using a three variable system consisting
of nominal income, a fiscal variable and a money variable to estimate a VAR. Using the
results, they use Granger causality tests of the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the
lagged growth rates of money are equal to zero in the nominal income equation. For the first
sample period the null hypothesis is rejected for the monetary base, M1, and M2. When the
sample is expanded to 1990, the null cannot be rejected for the monetary base. For the third
sample, the null can only be rejected for M1. Removing the fiscal variable yields similar
results. What’s more, when authors expand the data set to include the price index as well,
the null hypothesis is rejected for M1 and M2 in the first two samples, but cannot be rejected
for any money aggregate in the final sample. They argue that the experience of the 1980s
seems to have altered previous empirical relationships between money and nominal income.
The second stage continues this analysis by examining the stability of money demand for
the same three samples above with the variables expressed in levels rather than differences.12
For example, a typical long run money demand function is given by:
mt − pt = γ0 + γyyt + γrrt + et (4)
where m is the money supply, p is the price level, y is a scale variable of real economic
activity, r is the interest rate, and the variables are expressed in logarithms. For money
demand to be considered stable in the long run, any deviations in money demand must be
temporary.
12It is important to consider the level specification because of the potential for lost information when the
data is first-differenced. This point was recognized by Friedman and Kuttner.
10
The problem in estimating equation (4) is that all variables follow non-stationary I(1)
processes and as a result have no tendency to return to a long run level. Nevertheless, it
remains possible to examine the stability of money demand. For example, if deviations from
equation (4) are temporary, et should be stationary. This will be the case if the I(1) variables
are cointegrated, or share a common trend.
Friedman and Kuttner test the null hypothesis of no cointegration using the Johansen
maximal eigenvalue likelihood ratio statistic using the unrestricted model above and by
imposing two separate restrictions on equation (4); namely, a unitary income elasticity (β =
1) and an exclusion of the interest rate (γ = 0).13 For the unrestricted case, they reject
the null of no cointegration for the monetary base, M1, and M2 in the first sample. The
null hypothesis is rejected only for M2 in the second sample and cannot be rejected for any
measure of money in the final sample. Similar results hold for the restricted models. As a
result, Friedman and Kuttner (1992: 490) conclude that, “whatever the situation may have
been before the 1980’s, it is no longer possible to discern from the data a stable long-run
relationship between income and the monetary base, M1, or credit, either with or without
allowance for the effect of interest rates, and the evidence of such stability in the case of M2
strictly depends on the inclusion of data from the 1960’s.”
More recently, Estrella and Mishkin [1997] have used an approach similar to that of
Friedman and Kuttner to examine the role of money growth in determining inflation and
nominal income growth. Specifically, they estimate a VAR model that includes nominal
income growth, inflation, and either the monetary base of M2 as the preferred measure
of money growth using monthly data.14 The data set covers the period 1960:3 - 1995:12.
Also, the model is estimated for a subsample for the period beginning in October 1979 that
coincides with the appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve and is
an important break point for the analysis of simple sum money aggregates.
13A restriction of α = 0 is imposed on all models as the authors do not make explicit use of a constant
term in the paper.
14Inflation is thus defined as the change in the consumer price index. Nominal income growth is composed
of the Commerce Department’s index of coincident indicators and the consumer price index.
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Using the estimates from the three variable VAR, the authors conduct Granger causality
tests of the null hypothesis that the lags of a given variable are all equal to zero. In estimation
over the entire sample using the monetary base, the null hypothesis is rejected for the
influence of lagged money growth on both nominal income growth and inflation. What’s
more, nominal income growth and inflation do not predict money growth. However, when
the model is estimated in the subsample beginning in October 1979, the null hypothesis the
coefficients on lagged money are equal to zero cannot be rejected in the nominal income or
inflation equations. In fact, the null hypothesis is only rejected for the own lags of each
variable in the subsample.
The results using M2 are not promising either. For the entire sample, lagged money
does help to explain the growth in nominal income, but not inflation. Additionally, lagged
values of inflation and nominal income growth are found to influence money growth. In the
subsample, lagged values of money growth do not help to predict nominal income growth or
inflation growth. Finally, lagged values of inflation help to predict the movements in money
growth.
Overall, these results do not support the notion that money growth is a useful predictor
of nominal income growth and inflation in the period since 1979. Nevertheless, it is possible
that the poor performance of money as an information variable could be the result of coun-
tercyclical movements in money as a result of attempts to smooth fluctuations in inflation
and nominal income growth. Estrella and Mishkin investigate this claim by measuring the
size and significance of the sum of the coefficients on lagged nominal income growth and
inflation in the money growth equation. The results show that the coefficient sum is often
either not statistically significant or has the wrong sign. This is the case for both the mone-
tary base and M2. As a result there is little reason to believe that the changes identified in
the Granger causality tests are due to countercyclical movement in the money aggregates.
Whereas the literature discussed above focuses on the ability of money growth to predict
nominal output growth and inflation, a second major empirical claim of the cashless approach
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is that money does not provide any additional information to explain fluctuations in the
output gap. Empirically, this hypothesis can be tested by estimating the IS equation outlined
above. Such empirical analysis has been conducted by Rudebusch and Svensson [2002] using
a backward-looking IS equation of the form:
yt = β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + β3(it−1 − pit−1) + εt (5)
where y is the output gap defined as the percentage deviation of real output from the
Congressional Budget Office’s measure of potential, i is the federal funds rate, and pi is the
average rate of inflation rate as measured by the GDP deflator.
The parameter estimates are obtained using a sample of quarterly data from 1961 - 1996.
They find that the output gap has a strong autoregressive component and is negatively
related to the lagged real interest. All three parameters are statistically significant and they
report that these estimates are stable over time.15 Notably missing from this analysis is
money as the authors (ibid: 423) acknowledge that, “lags of nominal money (in levels or
growth rates) were insignificant when added” to the IS equation above. These results are
consistent with a complementary VAR approach used by Gerlach and Smets [1995] that
suggests that money aggregates fail to provide additional information when added to an
endogenous vector of output, inflation, and the interest rate.
The results outlined above cast serious doubt on the ability of money aggregates to explain
economic activity. The evidence suggests that money demand is unstable and monetary
aggregates are unable to explain movements in prices and nominal income. What’s more,
the lack of an identified role for money in explaining deviations in the output gap imply that
movements in money aggregates are not useful as an information variable.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical of this analysis. For example, recent
estimates by Nelson [2002] show that lags of the real monetary base do have a positive and
statistically significant effect on the output gap when added to Rudebusch and Svensson’s IS
15The specific results are listed below in direct comparison to the empirical analysis in this paper.
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equation. Similarly, Hafer et al. [2007] show real M2 has a positive and statistically significant
impact on the output gap independent of the real interest rate even in the subsample that
begins in the 1980s. What’s more, Hoffman et al. [1995] show that the demand for real M1 is
stable when a unitary income elasticity is imposed on the data. Also, Anderson and Rasche
[2001] find that the demand for the real monetary base is stable using annual data from 1919
- 1999.
This dissertation similarly argues that the results outlined above should be met with
skepticism. However, contrary to others, the analysis that follows suggests that the failure
to identify stability in the demand for money and a role for money in business cycles is the
result of the mismeasurement of the money aggregates. The idea of mismeasurement and its
implications are the subject of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3 Redundancy or Mismeasurement?
The empirical literature summarized in Chapter 2 is often cited as a justification for
excluding monetary aggregates from business cycle and monetary policy analysis. These
aggregates, however, are potentially flawed as they are not consistent with economic, index
number, or aggregation theory. This chapter re-examines the empirical evidence summarized
in Chapter 2 using monetary aggregates that are theoretically superior to their simple sum
counterparts. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 discusses an alternative to the
simple sum monetary aggregates known as the monetary services index, highlighting both the
qualitative and quantitative superiority of the latter. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 re-examine
the results of Friedman and Kuttner [1992], Estrella and Mishkin [1997], and Rudebusch
and Svensson [2002], respectively, using the monetary services index to measure money
rather than the simple sum aggregates to determine whether their results are driven by
mismeasurement. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Alternative Measures of Money
The vast majority of the empirical literature that estimates money demand functions and
the effects of money on real economic activity employs simple sum money aggregates in which
different monetary components are added together with equal weights. This procedure has
long been considered inadequate for measuring money.16 For example, in assessing different
measures of money included in their Monetary Statistics of the United States, Friedman and
Schwartz (1970: 151) noted that it would be more appropriate for the components of money
aggregates to be assigned a weight based on their degree of “moneyness.”
The reason that the weights of each asset are important is because the simple sum
money aggregates imply that each asset is a perfect substitute for all other assets in the
index. This is problematic because it is contrary to empirical evidence and as a result simple
16The earliest critic of simple arithmetic index numbers is likely Fisher [1922].
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sum aggregates fail to capture pure substitution effects across assets.17 The failure of simple
sum aggregates to capture these substitution effects is important as it necessarily implies
that there has been some change in the subutility function pertaining to monetary services
and thus, potentially, the observed instability of money demand discussed above.
An alternative to the simple sum aggregates is the monetary services index derived by
Barnett [1980] in which monetary assets are weighted by their expenditure shares.18 For-
mally, this can be expressed as follows
dlogMt =
n∑
i=1
w¯itdlogxit
where w¯it is the expenditure share averaged over the two periods and xit is the quantity of
component i at time t. The numerator of the expenditure share, wit, is the product of the
user cost of the particular asset and dollar quantity of that asset. The denominator is the
summation of these products over all assets in the index. Here the user cost of an asset is
derived from Barnett [1978] as
uit =
(Rt − rit)
(1 +Rt)
Pt
where uit is the nominal user cost of asset i at time t, R is the benchmark rate of return, ri
is the return on asset i, and P is the price level.19
The derivation of the monetary services index (henceforth MSI) is important for two
reasons. First, these aggregates are derived from explicit microfoundations and are consistent
with aggregation and index number theory. Second, the MSI aggregates are capable of
adapting to financial innovation both through the introduction of new money assets or a
change in the interest-bearing properties of a given asset. Simple sum indexes do not satisfy
17Cf. Barnett et al. [1992]; Serletis [2001]
18These aggregates have often been called “Divisia” aggregates in the literature because they are con-
structed using the Divisia method of aggregation. The term monetary services index is the name chosen by
the St. Louis Federal Reserve in the official publication of the data (Anderson et al. [1997a]; Anderson et al.
[1997b]). This name is meant to reflect the fact that these aggregates measure a flow of services from a class
of assets rather than a stock of assets.
19Donovan [1978] argues that the user cost concept is more appropriate for determining the price of money
than the traditional form of assigning a price of unity.
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either criteria.
Despite the clear theoretical superiority of the weighted money aggregates, it is not clear
a priori that this necessarily implies a corresponding quantitative difference with simple
sum aggregates. In order to facilitate such a comparison, the differences between MSI M1,
MSI M2, MSI MZM, and the simple sum counterparts are plotted in Figures 1 - 3.20 It is
important to note that differences in the growth rates are most notable in the 1980s, the
decade in which money supposedly became less useful as both an intermediate target and an
information variable.21 In addition, the growth of simple sum M2 is greater than the MSI
counterpart for most of sample.
These differences in growth rates are, in fact, quantitatively important. For example,
Belongia [2005] finds that during the 1960s and 1970s, the differences between the growth
rates of simple sum M1 have a unit root. Thus, following the simple sum aggregate could
potentially result in vastly divergent predictions than the MSI counterpart.
What’s more, these differences seem to be most important during the time in which
money is thought to have lost its predictive ability. Barnett [1997] highlights the so-called
monetarist experiment of 1979 - 1982, in which the Federal Reserve targeted the money
supply, as well as the remainder of the early 1980s as two such instances. Specifically, for the
period encapsulating the monetarist experiment, Barnett [1997] shows that simple sum M2
and M3 grew at an average rate of 9.3% and 10%, respectively, whereas the MSI counterparts
grew at 4.5% and 4.8%. These average rates came on the heels of double-digit growth rates
20Throughout the paper, MSI M1, MSI M2, and MSI MZM are used as money aggregates. These aggregates
are the monetary services index counterparts to the simple sum aggregates M1, M2, and MZM. M1 consists
of currency, demand deposits, traveler’s checks, as well as other checkable deposits such as negotiable order
of withdraw (NOW) accounts. M2 includes all components of M1 as well as savings deposits, money market
deposit accounts, small-denomination time deposits, and retail money market mutual funds. Finally, MZM
(money with zero maturity) consists of the components of M2 (less time deposits) as well as institutional
money market mutual funds. In choosing these aggregates, this paper explicitly ignores a second problem with
monetary aggregation, which is the composition of assets within the aggregate. In other words, assigning
weights to assets within an aggregate is not sufficient for designing a valid aggregate. Nonetheless, the
emphasis in this paper is in providing analysis with aggregates in which the composition is well-known.
21This point is potentially of importance. In the examination of simple sum aggregates, some such as
Carlson et al. [2000] have argued that changes in the stability of money demand driven by structural shifts
should be adjusted accordingly. Others, such as Woodford [1998], have argued that such shifts are what
make money demand unstable and unusable.
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Figure 1: Differences in Growth Rates – M1
Figure 2: Differences in Growth Rates – M2
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for both the simple sum and MSI aggregates. Thus, using the MSI aggregates, it is much
easier to understand why contractionary monetary policy resulted in a severe recession rather
than a mild disinflation.
Figure 3: Differences in Growth Rates – MZM
The differences in growth rates between MSI and simple sum aggregates can also explain
why dire monetarist predictions of rising inflation in the subsequent period were incorrect.
For example, in a September 1983 Newsweek article, Milton Friedman predicted the acceler-
ated money growth would lead to stagflation. Ironically, on the same day, William Barnett
argued in Forbes that the concerns over rapid money growth were a statistical blip of simple
sum aggregation. Specifically, Barnett argued that the sudden increase in money growth
from 1982 - 1983 observed in simple sum aggregates was the result of the addition of new
financial assets, such as NOW accounts and money market deposit accounts. As noted by
Barnett [1997], the differences in the growth rates of the monetary aggregates can be ex-
plained by the way in which these new assets are introduced. New assets are simply added to
simple sum aggregates. In contrast, new assets are introduced to MSI aggregates using the
appropriate weight. Thus, given that the interest rates on these new assets were relatively
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high, the weight was correspondingly low thereby making for a smooth introduction to the
MSI aggregate. Note that this change is highlighted by the largest spike in the growth rate
differences shown in Figures 1 - 3.22 It is also important to highlight the fact that among
the aggregates the difference is largest for MZM, which includes both new assets.23
In addition to the differences highlighted by casual inference, recent empirical evidence
does suggest that the way in which money is measured has important implications for one’s
results. For example, Belongia [1996] re-examines five puzzling results from the monetary
literature by utilizing MSI aggregates rather than their simple sum counterparts. He finds
that four of the five puzzling results exist only when simple sum aggregates are used. The
results are mixed for the fifth result. In addition, international evidence collected in Belongia
and Binner [2000] shows that MSI aggregates outperform their simple sum counterparts for
most countries.
Given these results, it is important to re-examine the empirical evidence using the MSI
measures of money rather than the simple sum indexes, which are at best theoretically
flawed and at worst empirically misleading. This re-examination is the subject of the three
subsequent sections.
3.2 Money Demand in a Time Series Framework
As discussed in Chapter 2, Friedman and Kuttner [1992] examine the stability of long-
run money demand within the context of cointegration. This section outlines the analysis of
money demand within a time series framework for both full sample and recursive estimation.
This framework is then used to test for cointegration, estimate the parameters of the money
demand function, and analyze the stability of each across samples. The results are then
compared with those using simple sum aggregates.
22Note that even if one recognized that this was the reason for the spike in the growth rate in simple sum
aggregates, it would still be difficult to assess how much of the change was the result of the introduction of
new assets and how much was the result of monetary policy.
23M2 also includes both assets, but also includes time deposits that are not included in MZM.
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3.2.1 Long-run Stability of Money Demand
Recall the long run money demand equation outlined in equation (4) in Chapter 2:
mt − pt = γ0 + γyyt + γrrt
where m is the money supply, p is the price level, y is a scale variable of real economic
activity, r is a price variable usually measured by an interest rate, and the variables are
expressed in logarithms.24
As previously mentioned, given that each of these variables are non-stationary, there
must exist a linear combination of the variables that is stationary for money demand to
be considered stable in the long run.25 In other words, money demand stability requires
that deviations from equilibrium are temporary. Formally, this can be shown by re-writing
equation (4) as
mt − pt − γ0 − γyyt − γrrt = et
where et represents the deviation of the money demand from its long run equilibrium. If
money demand is stable, et should be stationary with mean zero. As noted above, if et is
stationary, the variables that comprise the money demand function are said to be cointe-
grated.
In order to determine whether there exists a stable money demand function, it is useful to
employ an error correction VAR approach. The use of this approach is important because in
addition to testing for cointegration, it provides an estimate of the money demand function
parameters. Formally, the p-dimensional error correction VAR model is given by:
∆xt = Γ1∆xt−1 + · · ·+ Γk∆xt−k +Πxt−1 + εt
24Whether or not rt is measured in logarithms depends on how the variable is defined. Traditionally, if rt
is measured by an interest rate it is not expressed in logarithmic form. Below, rt is measured as the price
dual of the monetary aggregate and is expressed in logarithmic form.
25Evidence of non-stationarity is found in Appendix 1.
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where xt is a vector of non-stationary I(1) endogenous variables, and Γi, i = 1, . . . , k, and
Π are (p x p) parameter matrices.26 Within this context, the cointegration hypothesis is
expressed as a reduced rank restriction on Π, which can be written as the product of two
matrices:
Π = αβ′
where α and β are (p x r), r ≤ p, matrices of adjustment coefficients and long run equilibrium
coefficients, respectively, and rank(Π) = r. As a result, the cointegrated VAR can be re-
written:
∆xt = Γ1∆xt−1 + · · ·+ Γk∆xt−k + αβ′xt−1 + εt (6)
where β′xt is an (r x 1) vector of long-run cointegrating relationships. It follows that the
rank of Π is equal to the number of cointegrating vectors. The existence of a stable long run
money demand function is therefore consistent with a cointegrating vector:
β′xt = (mt − pt)− γ0 − γyyt − γrrt = 0
One can determine the rank of Π and therefore the number of cointegrating vectors using
Johansen’s trace test statistic, which is given by:
τ(p− r) = −T
p∑
i=r+1
ln(1− λˆi)
where λi are the eigenvalues from the estimated matrix Π and T is the number of obser-
vations. This test statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that the number of
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r. Once the number of cointegrating vectors are
identified, one can impose the corresponding rank of Π on the cointegrated VAR to estimate
the parameters of the money demand function (should a single cointegrating vector exist).
26In accordance with equation (4) above, a constant is included in the cointegrating vector.
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3.2.2 Examining Structural Stability
While the existence of cointegration is a necessary condition for money demand stability,
it is not sufficient. For example, the results in Friedman and Kuttner [1992] suggest that the
ability to identify cointegration is potentially dependent on the sample. Intuitively, this can
be understood by considering the conditions under which cointegration will exist. As outlined
above, when the disturbance et is stationary, the variables that comprise the money demand
function are cointegrated. Nonetheless, as McCallum [1993] notes, the unique properties
of money in facilitating transactions might lead to the non-stationarity of et. For example,
innovations in transactions technology are unlikely to be captured by any measurable variable
and will be reflected in et. Since such innovations are not likely to be reversible, it is possible
that there will be a permanent component in the et process that makes it non-stationary.
It follows that the existence of money demand stability, examined within the context of
cointegration, might differ over time.27 As a result, the present analysis seeks to consider
the stability of the number of cointegrating relationships as well as the coefficient estimates
across samples using recursive estimation.
In order to evaluate stability, the model is estimated for an initial sample period, 1, . . . , T1,
and then recursively extending the endpoint of the subsample until the complete sample,
1, . . . , T , is estimated. Recursive tests outlined in Hansen and Johansen [1999] and Juselius
[2006] can then be used to examine the constancy of the trace test statistics, the eigenvalues
of Π, and the parameters of the cointegrating vector.
The first test of stability is to consider the hypothesis of cointegration across samples. As
shown in Juselius [2006], the stability of cointegrating relationships can be examined using
27McCallum [1993] argues that the failure to identify cointegration does not necessarily imply a rejection
of money demand stability. Others, such as Hoffman et al. [1995] and Carlson et al. [2000], have argued this
point as well and have therefore used dummy variables in the cointegrating vector to control for purported
structural breaks associated with financial innovation or deregulation. However, as noted by Christ [1993],
a good economic model should fit the data well and be useful for predicting future relationships. While
incorporating dummies might improve the fit of the model, it is unlikely to be used successfully for prediction
until structural shifts are identified. The monetary services indexes have the potential to solve this problem.
More will be said on this final point below.
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recursively calculated trace statistics:
τ(j) =
{
− t1
j∑
i=1
ln(1− λˆi)
}
j = 1, . . . p; t1 = T1, . . . , T
where λi, i = 1, . . . , p, are the eigenvalues of Π. This is identical to trace statistic outlined
above except that it is estimated for each subsample in the recursive estimation. As a result,
one can determine whether the existence of cointegration is dependent on the endpoint of
the sample.
In addition to the existence of a single cointegrating vector across samples, a stable money
demand function should also be associated with the constancy of parameters within the
existing cointegrating vector across samples. Hansen and Johansen [1999] provide methods
by which to examine parameter constancy. Two such methods are employed presently.
The first method of evaluating parameter stability is the eigenvalue fluctuations test. As
shown in Juselius [2006], the eigenvalues of Π can be expressed as a quadratic function of αi
and βi, i = 1, . . . , r. It follows that fluctuations in the parameters in the i
th column of α or
β will be reflected in the eigenvalue λi. The eigenvalue fluctuations test examines whether
the eigenvalues are constant across samples. What’s more, given that the trace statistic
is a function of the sample size and the eigenvalues, the fluctuations test enables one to
determine whether a failure to identify a cointegrating vector is the result of a small sample
or non-constant eigenvalues, which might reflect instability.
Formally, the test statistic for the fluctuations test is expressed as:
τi(t1) =
t1
T
√
TΣ
−1/2
ii (λˆi,t1 − λˆi,T ) t1 = T1, . . . , T
where Σii is the variance of λi defined by Hansen and Johansen [1999], λi,t1 is the eigenvalue
i, i = 1, . . . , p, of the subsample ending at t1, and λi,T is the eigenvalue i of the complete
sample. For the model estimated here, rank(Π) = 1 and thus there is one eigenvalue to
examine for each monetary aggregate.
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The second test to examine parameter stability is the max test of a constant β defined
in Hansen and Johansen [1999], which tests the null hypothesis that βˆt = βˆT , where t =
T1, . . . , T is the endpoint of the sample. Formally, this test is based on the Nyblom [1989]
statistic for examining parameter stability. The Nyblom statistic is defined as follows. Let θ
be a vector of parameters. The score statistic, S(T ), and the information statistic, J (T ), are
defined, respectively:
S(T )(θ) =
∂L(T )(θ)
∂θ
J (T )(θ) = −∂
2L(T )(θ)
∂θ2
where L is the likelihood function. The Nyblom test statistic can then be written
Q
(t)
T ≈ tr{(θˆ(T ) − θˆ(t))′J (t)(θˆ(t))J (T )(θˆ(T ))−1J (t)(θˆ(t))(θˆ(T ) − θˆ(t))}
This statistic is adapted to the cointegrated VAR model as follows. First, the likelihood
function can be written:
L(t)(θ1, θ2, θ3) =
t∏
s=1
f(Xs|Xs−1, . . . , Xs−k+1, θ1, θ2, θ3)
where θ1 = β, θ2 = (α,Ω), and θ3 = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk).
Second, the coefficient estimates, βˆ(t) are normalized for all t. Defining
c =
(
βˆ(T )
0
)
,
c⊥ =
(
βˆ
(T )
⊥ 0
0 1
)
,
and
c¯ = c(c′c)−1
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the normalized coefficients can be written:
βˆ(t)c = βˆ
(t){c¯′βˆ(t)}−1
αˆ(t)c = αˆ
(t)βˆ(t)
′
c¯
The test statistic for examining the constancy of the parameters can therefore be written
Q
(t)
T =
(
t
T
)2
tr[V (T )q(t)
′
M (t){M (T )}−1M (t)q(t)]
where
q(t) = T c¯′{βˆ(t)c − βˆ(T )}
V (T ) = αˆ(T )
′
c {Ωˆ(T )}−1αˆ(T )c
M (t) = T−1c′⊥S
t(t)
11 c⊥
M (T ) = T−1c′⊥S
T (t)
11 c⊥
S
t(t)
11 =
1
t
t∑
s=1
R
(t)
1t R
(t)′
1t
S
T (t)
11 =
1
t
t∑
s=1
R
(T )
1t R
(T )′
1t
where R1t is defined in the R-form of the model below and Ωˆ = V ar(εt). The distribution
of the test statistic is determined by simulation.
3.2.3 Estimation Results
Before estimating the model it is important to determine how the variables are measured.
Real money balances are measured by MSI M1, MSI M2, and MSI MZM adjusted by the
GDP deflator. Typically, the scale variable is measured by some measure of real economic
activity such as real Gross Domestic Product. However, given that money demand is derived
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from consumer choice theory, real GDP is not likely to be the proper measure of income even
for a representative agent. As a result, the scale variable used in this paper is the real final
sales of domestic production.28
The own price of money is generally proxied by the use of the opportunity cost of holding
money, which is often measured by a short term interest rate.29 Ultimately, however, the use
of the interest rate as the price of money is incorrect. As Belongia (2006: 240) notes, this
“confuses the concepts of ’credit’ and ’money’.” The appropriate measure of the own price
of money when using a monetary services index is straightforward as it is given by the price
dual of the monetary services index.30,31
With the variables now properly defined, the cointegrated VAR model is estimated using
a sample of quarterly data that spans 1960 - 2005 for each measure of money using lag
lengths determined by Hannan-Quinn information criteria [Hannan and Quinn, 1979].32
Full Sample Results The existence of cointegration is tested using the Johansen trace
statistic. Estimates are shown in Table 1. For each definition of money, the null hypothesis
of no cointegration is rejected. What’s more, the null hypothesis that r ≤ 1 cannot be
rejected for any measure of money. This is important because it provides evidence of the
existence of a single cointegrating vector, which is consistent with the idea of a stable long
run money demand function.
With the rank of Π identified, the model is now re-estimated by imposing the restriction,
rank(Π) = 1. With the coefficient on real money balances normalized to unity, the corre-
28The results are not sensitive to this specification.
29Poole [1988] suggests that a long term interest rate should be used. Hoffman et al. [1995] note that it is
of little consequence in a cointegrating VAR model as such interest rates are typically cointegrated and thus
adding an additional interest rate would simply result in an additional cointegrating vector.
30A price index number is the dual of the quantity index when the product of the quantity index and the
price dual equal the total expenditure on the assets in the quantity aggregate. This can be thought of as the
price of one unit of monetary services. For more, see Anderson et al. [1997b].
31It remains possible that an interest rate can serve as an opportunity cost variable that shifts the demand
curve. However, using the yield on the 90-day Treasury bill, the hypothesis that the interest rate could be
excluded from the money demand function as tested by a restriction on the cointegrating vector could not
be rejected. As such, the interest rate is excluded from the results below.
32The end date of the sample is 2005 because that is the terminal date for which data on the monetary
services indexes are available.
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Table 1: Trace Statistics
Monetary Variable r Trace P-Value
MSI M1 0 51.67 0.00
1 11.95 0.46
2 3.43 0.52
MSI M2 0 79.29 0.00
1 9.93 0.65
2 3.10 0.57
MSI MZM 0 86.39 0.00
1 12.61 0.40
2 2.37 0.71
Table 2: Cointegrated VAR Parameter Estimates
Monetary Variable γy γr γ0
MSI M1 0.39 -0.72 1.18
MSI M2 0.77 -0.61 1.45
MSI MZM 1.07 -1.14 1.88
sponding coefficient estimates of the cointegrating vector are shown in Table 2. In accordance
with economic theory, one would expect that γy > 0 and γr < 0. As shown in Table 2, these
conditions are satisfied for each measure of money. Overall, these results provide evidence
of a stable long run money demand function for the estimation of the full sample.
Recursive Estimation Results Each of the test statistics from recursive estimation is
calculated using the X-form and the R-form of the cointegrated VAR. The X-form of the
cointegrated VAR is given by equation (6) above. The R-form of the model concentrates out
the short-run dynamics, Γi, i = 1, . . . , k, of equation (6). The derivation of the R-form is as
follows. Define Z0,t = ∆xt, Z1,t = xt−1, and Z2,t = [∆x′t−1, . . . ,∆x
′
t−k], and Ψ = [Γ1, . . . ,Γk].
The VAR can now be re-written as
Z0,t = αβ
′Z1,t +ΨZ2,t + εt
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Following the Frisch-Waugh theorem one can concentrate out the short-run dynamics of the
model, ΨZ2,t, to obtain an estimate of αβ
′ in three steps. First, regress Z0,t on Z2,t and
obtain the residuals
R0,t = Z0,t − Bˆ′1Z2,t
where Bˆ′1 are the OLS estimates.
Second, regress Z1,t on Z2,t and obtain the residuals
R1,t = Z1,t − Bˆ′2Z2,t
where Bˆ′2 are the OLS estimates.
Finally, regress the residuals from the first regression, R0,t, on the residuals from the
second regression, R1,t to obtain the estimate of αβ
′:
R0,t = αβ
′R1,t + t (7)
Equation (7) is known as the R-form of the model.33
The purpose of estimating the test statistics from both the X-form and the R-form is
that it enables one to determine whether the results are driven by the short-run dynamics of
the model. For example, if a hypothesis can be rejected only in the R-form of the model, one
can reasonably assert that the failure to reject the hypothesis in the X-form of the model
is the result of short-run dynamics. This distinction is important because, in the case of
money demand, the long run is of primary importance. Finally, for both the X- and R-form
of the model, the test statistics have been divided by the 95% quantile of the corresponding
distribution and plotted graphically. A rejection of the null hypothesis is therefore shown as
a value greater than unity on the appropriate graph.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the recursive trace statistics for MSI M1, MSI M2, and MSI
33The derivation of the R-form is based on Juselius [2006] and Hansen and Johansen [1999]. As with the
X-form of the model, equation (7) is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
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MZM, respectively. As shown in Figure 4, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be
rejected in all samples for the X-form of the model. For the R-form of the model, the null
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected until the late 1980s. This latter result
would seem to provide evidence against a stable money demand function. However, it is
important to consider sample size in the context of the test. As shown above, the recursive
trace test statistic is a function of the sample size and the eigenvalues of Π. As a result, this
test is not conclusive.34
Figures 5 and 6 show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for both
the X-form and the R-form of the models for MSI M2 and MSI MZM. Curiously, the null
hypothesis of r ≤ 1 is also rejected in the X-form of the model for both of these measures of
money in the earliest samples. This suggests that two cointegrating vectors exist. However,
this is an instance where the distinction between the X-form and R-form of the model is
important. The fact that the R-form of the model for both MSI M2 and MSI MZM suggests
that there is one cointegrating relation for all samples implies that the results from the X-
form of the model are driven by the model’s short-run dynamics. In other words, Figures 5
and 6 provide strong evidence for the existence of one cointegrating vector across all samples.
This is contrary to the results of Friedman and Kuttner [1992].
34As noted in Johansen [2002], the small sample properties of the trace test are different from the asymp-
totic properties. As a result, for the smaller samples in recursive estimation, it is possible that the failure to
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration is due to sample size. More will be said on this point below.
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Having tested for the existence of cointegration across samples, it is now important to
consider the constancy of the parameters within the cointegrating vector. Given that the
eigenvalues of Π can be shown to be a quadratic function of β, the existence of constant
parameters in the cointegrating vector across samples implies that the eigenvalues should
also be constant. What’s more, the recursively calculated trace statistics in Figure 4 provide
mixed evidence for the existence of a cointegrating vector. Since the trace statistic is a
function of the sample size and eigenvalues, the eigenvalue fluctuations test allows one to
determine whether the failure to identify cointegration in the earliest samples is the result
of non-constant eigenvalues or the small size of the sample.
The recursive eigenvalue fluctuation test statistics are plotted in Figures 7 - 9. As shown,
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated eigenvalue in each subsample is
equal to that of the entire sample for any measure of money in both the X- and R-form
of the model. These results are important because they provide evidence, for all measures
of money, that the parameters of the cointegrating vector are constant across samples. In
addition, the fact that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant eigenvalues for MSI
M1 can be taken as evidence that the failure to identify cointegration in the R-form of the
model for the earliest samples is the result of the small size of the sample.
Figure 7: Fluctuations Test – MSI M1
Finally, Figures 10 - 12 plot the test statistic associated with the max test of a constant
34
Figure 8: Fluctuations Test – MSI M2
Figure 9: Fluctuations Test – MSI MZM
35
β. Again, this test is used to determine whether the parameters in β for each subsample are
equal those from the entire sample. For both MSI M1 and MSI MZM, one cannot reject the
null hypothesis of constant parameters in the cointegrating vector. For MSI M2, however,
the hypothesis can be rejected for one subsample.35 Nonetheless, the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected for any other subsample. Broadly, these results suggest that the parameters of
the cointegrating vector are constant for each measure of money.
35It is interesting to note that this result is sensitive to lag length. Using Akaike information criteria rather
than Hannan-Quinn, the choice of lag length is one period longer. Using that lag specification, one cannot
reject the null hypothesis for any subsample. The change in lag length does not influence any of the other
results.
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A Comparison with Simple Sum Aggregates As a method of comparison, the cointe-
grated VAR model is now estimated using the simple sum counterparts to MSI M1, MSI M2,
and MSI MZM. In addition, following convention in traditional money demand estimation,
rt is defined as the yield on the 90-day Treasury bill. This alternative specification can be
used to examine the hypothesis of mismeasurement.
Consistent with the analysis above, recursively estimated trace statistics are used to test
for the existence of cointegration across samples. Economic theory implies that there should
be evidence of a single cointegrating vector. The recursively estimated trace statistics are
divided by the 95% quantile and plotted in Figures 13 - 15 for simple sum M1, M2, and
MZM, respectively.
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The recursively calculated trace statistics plotted in Figure 13 show that the null hy-
pothesis of no cointegration can be rejected for all samples in the X-form of the model using
simple sum M1. These results are mostly consistent with the R-form of the model as well.
As shown in Figure 14, however, there is evidence of multiple cointegrating relations when
money is measured by simple sum M2 in the X-form of the model for most samples. Iso-
lating the short-run dynamics of the model removes some evidence of multiple cointegrating
relations. However, for samples ending in the 1970s, there remains evidence of multiple coin-
tegrating relations. In addition, for samples ending in the late 1990s and early 2000s, one can
marginally reject the null hypothesis that rank(Π) ≤ 1 at the 5% level, which provides evi-
dence of multiple cointegrating relations. Finally, in Figure 15 there is evidence of multiple
cointegrating relations in the X-form of the model using simple sum MZM for samples ending
in the 1970s. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 15, isolating the short-run dynamics
of the model does not remove the evidence of multiple cointegrating relations as it does for
MSI MZM. In fact, in the R-form of the model, one cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration for most samples that end in the 1980s.
Overall, these results do not provide consistent evidence of a stable money demand func-
tion for simple sum M2 and simple sum MZM. In both the X-form and the R-form of the
model, there is evidence of multiple cointegrating relations in the samples that end in the
1970s, which is not consistent with economic theory. While it is true that there was similar
evidence of multiple cointegrating vectors in the X-form of the model for MSI M2 and MSI
MZM, isolating the short-run dynamics was sufficient to identify one cointegrating relation
across samples. The same cannot be said for the simple sum counterparts.
In addition, there is evidence of multiple cointegrating relation for samples ending in the
late 1990s in both the X- and R-form of the model using simple sum M2. Finally, for many
samples ending in the 1980s, one cannot reject the null of no cointegration in the R-form of
the model using simple sum MZM as the monetary aggregate. These results are particularly
important for the R-form of the model, which should provide the best evidence regarding the
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long-run structure of the model since it isolates the short-run dynamics. Most importantly
for the hypothesis of mismeasurement, the results using simple sum aggregates are in stark
contrast to those in the R-form of the model using MSI M2 and MSI MZM, in which there
is consistent evidence of one cointegrating relation across all samples.
Summary Overall, the results from the cointegrated VAR models using the monetary
services indexes are important because they contrast significantly with those of Friedman
and Kuttner [1992]. Whereas their work suggests that money demand is not stable since
the 1980s, the evidence presented above suggests that the stability of money demand is an
empirical reality when a monetary services index is used as the monetary aggregate. For
each measure of the monetary services index, there does exist a single cointegrating relation
with reasonable and stable parameter values for a money demand function across samples.
What’s more, the only instances in which the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected
are those in which the sample size is too small as evident in the eigenvalue fluctuations test
above. In contrast, when using either simple sum M2 or simple sum MZM as the monetary
aggregate, the number of cointegrating relations is dependent on the end date of sample.
This latter conclusion is not fundamentally altered by isolating the short-run dynamics of
the model. Taken together, these results therefore provide credence to the hypothesis that
empirical failures relating to money demand are an issue of mismeasurement.
3.3 Money, Income, and Prices
A central tenet of any quantity theoretic framework is that changes in the money supply
should help predict subsequent changes in nominal income and prices. As described in
Chapter 2, Estrella and Mishkin [1997] fail to find evidence of such a relationship using
Granger causality tests on a three variable system consisting of nominal income growth,
inflation, and money growth. This section re-examines their results using two approaches.
The first approach is to estimate a standard VAR model of the three variable system of
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Table 3: Granger Causality Tests – Pre-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Inflation MSI
MSI M1 Nom. GDP 0.81 0.82 0.23
Inflation 0.39 0.00 0.01
MSI M1 0.09 0.01 0.00
MSI M2 Nom. GDP 0.64 0.73 0.09
Inflation 0.34 0.00 0.01
MSI M2 0.17 0.01 0.00
MSI MZM Nom. GDP 0.60 0.78 0.07
Inflation 0.36 0.00 0.02
MSI MZM 0.09 0.02 0.00
Estrella and Mishkin [1997] and use Granger causality tests to determine whether money
growth, as measured by the MSI data, can predict nominal income growth and inflation. The
role of countercyclical monetary policy is also considered. Second, given the fact that the
levels of nominal income, the price level, and the monetary services indexes each have a unit
root and are cointegrated, a cointegrated VAR model is estimated and Granger causality
tests conducted for the three variable system in levels. The results of each approach are then
contrasted with those using simple sum aggregates.
3.3.1 Causality in a Standard VAR
This section adopts the three variable system of Estrella and Mishkin, estimates the
corresponding VARs, and conducts Granger causality tests of the null hypothesis that lags
of a given variable do not effect the particular variable in question. Nominal income growth
is measured by nominal GDP growth, inflation by the change in the GDP deflator, and
money growth by the monetary services indexes. To facilitate comparison with Estrella and
Mishkin, the model is estimated over two samples, with the break point occurring in October
1979.36
Table 3 presents the p-values of the Granger causality tests for the three variable system
for the pre-1979 sample. The results are printed such that the null hypothesis is that the
36The lag length for the VARs are determined by lag length specification tests.
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests – Post-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Inflation MSI
MSI M1 Nom. GDP 0.00 0.94 0.31
Inflation 0.15 0.00 0.02
MSI M1 0.61 0.02 0.00
MSI M2 Nom. GDP 0.00 0.45 0.31
Inflation 0.48 0.00 0.00
MSI M2 0.06 0.25 0.00
MSI MZM Nom. GDP 0.00 0.25 0.19
Inflation 0.65 0.00 0.02
MSI MZM 0.00 0.31 0.00
column variable does not predict the row variable. These results suggest that money, as
measured by MSI M2 and MSI MZM, does help to predict nominal GDP growth. What’s
more, the lags of all measures of money help to predict the inflation rate.
The p-values for the Granger causality tests for the post-1979 era are shown in Table 4.
These results are different both from the pre-1979 results and those shown in Estrella and
Mishkin for the same period. In contrast to the earlier sample and consistent with the work
highlighted above, each measure of the monetary aggregate cannot predict fluctuations in
nominal GDP growth. Contrary of Estrella and Mishkin, however, is that all of the money
aggregates are useful for predicting inflation.
3.3.2 The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy
While the ability of the growth rates of the monetary services indexes to predict inflation
is a notable improvement over the results shown in Estrella and Mishkin [1997], it remains
somewhat puzzling that the same aggregates cannot predict nominal income growth in this
latter period. One potential reason for this failure could be the result of the fact that
movements in the money supply are reflecting an increased responsiveness of monetary policy
to fluctuations in nominal income growth post-1979.37 For example, if the central bank is
responding to both changes in inflation and the output gap, as is a generally accepted
37Hendrickson [2010] shows this to be the case, but uses the federal funds rate as the measure of monetary
policy rather than a measure of the money supply.
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proposition for the United States, this will likely be reflected in the bank’s responsiveness
to nominal income growth. Upon casual inspection, this is potentially the case as nominal
income growth does help predict the growth rates of two of the three money aggregates in
the VAR model as shown in Table 4.
The idea that central bank policy might explain the failures of monetary aggregates to
predict nominal income can be directly tested in two different ways. First, one can test this
hypothesis by estimating a central bank reaction function in which the bank’s intermediate
target is a money aggregate and its target is nominal income growth. Formally, this can be
tested by estimating the following regression:
∆Mt = α+ β∆xt + et
where ∆Mt is the growth rate of the money supply, ∆xt is nominal income growth, and α is a
constant.38 For this regression, nominal income growth is measured by the Federal Reserve’s
Greenbook forecast of nominal income growth.39 The use of the forecast of nominal income
growth is important because it eliminates the possibility of capturing reverse causation while
also using data that was available to policymakers in real time.
The results of this regression are shown in Table 5.40 The results indicate that the Federal
Reserve forecast of nominal income growth did have a negative and statistically significant
effect on the growth rate of MSI M2 and MSI MZM in the post-1979 era. This therefore lends
credence to the claim that the failure of monetary aggregates to predict nominal income is the
result of the fact that changes in nominal income have feedback effects on money aggregates
through monetary policy.
38Formally, this model could be re-written as:
∆Mt = δ0 + δ1(∆x¯−∆xt) + et
where x¯ is the nominal income growth target. Thus, in the regression above, α = δ0 + δ1∆x¯ and β = −δ1.
39This data is readily available through the Philadelphia Federal Reserve. The sample estimated is from
1979:4 - 2003:4 as that is the latest data available.
40The t-statistics correspond to Newey-West standard errors due to the evidence of serial correlation in a
standard, ordinary least squares regression.
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Table 5: Central Bank Reaction Function – Post-1979
Variable Coefficient t-stat
MSI M1 Constant 0.01 3.55
∆NGDP Forecast 0.03 0.62
MSI M2 Constant 0.02 7.28
∆NGDP Forecast -0.06 -1.66
MSI MZM Constant 0.03 7.20
∆NGDP Forecast -0.20 -2.35
A second way to examine whether monetary policy can explain why money growth cannot
predict nominal income growth is to consider a case in which money aggregates are truly
exogenous. For example, Rowe and Rodriguez [2007] find that changes in the growth rate of
U.S. simple sum monetary aggregates do not Granger cause fluctuations in the growth rate of
U.S. real GDP. However, changes in the growth rate of U.S. simple sum monetary aggregates
do explain fluctuations in the real GDP of Hong Kong, whose currency is pegged to the U.S.
dollar. Intuitively, this is the case because U.S. monetary policy reacts to fluctuations in
measures of real activity in the U.S., but not Hong Kong. As a result, changes in the money
supply in the U.S. should be exogenous to Hong Kong.
Thus, as a further method of comparison, the three variable system outlined above is
re-estimated using nominal income growth and inflation from Hong Kong and the MSI
aggregates from the U.S. The sample period runs from 1983:1 - 1997:2.41 The results are
shown in Table 6. Based on the results, the growth of monetary aggregates can be considered
exogenous for MSI M1 and MSI M2 as these are not predicted by nominal income growth or
inflation. In addition, the same monetary aggregates do help predict Hong Kong’s nominal
income growth and inflation rate. Again, this tends to lend credence to the view that the
failure to identify a role for monetary aggregates in predicting nominal income growth is the
result of monetary policy.
Overall, the results from the three variable VAR using the monetary services index as
41The sample is chosen as representing the period from the first peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the
U.S. dollar until the handing over of Hong Kong to the Chinese and the re-pegging that occurred shortly
thereafter.
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Table 6: Granger Causality p-values – Hong Kong
Variable HK Nom. GDP HK Inflation MSI
MSI M1 HK Nom. GDP 0.00 0.01 0.02
HK Inflation 0.03 0.03 0.04
MSI M1 0.17 0.39 0.00
MSI M2 HK Nom. GDP 0.00 0.07 0.02
HK Inflation 0.33 0.46 0.92
MSI M2 0.17 0.58 0.00
MSI MZM HK Nom. GDP 0.00 0.19 0.15
HK Inflation 0.02 0.67 0.68
MSI MZM 0.20 0.08 0.00
the method of aggregation for the money supply indicate that money growth is an important
predictor of inflation for all measures of money and all sample periods. This is important
because previous research that relies on simple sum monetary aggregates find no such relation
in the post-1979 era. The results with regards to nominal income, however, are somewhat
mixed. In the pre-1979 era, MSI M2 and MSI MZM do help to predict nominal income
growth. However, consistent with earlier research, this relationship does not hold in the post-
1979 era. Nevertheless, this failure in the latter period is likely the result of countercyclical
monetary policy. As evidence in support of this claim MSI M2 and MSI MZM demonstrate
a statistically significant response to the Federal Reserve’s forecast of nominal GDP growth.
What’s more, the U.S. MSI aggregates do help to predict nominal GDP growth and inflation
in Hong Kong, a country whose currency is pegged to the U.S. dollar. Ultimately, the
results in this subsection cast doubt on earlier research that finds money curiously unable to
predict inflation. In addition, and again contrary to earlier research, the inability of money
aggregates to explain nominal income growth is shown to be the result of countercyclical
monetary policy.
3.3.3 Causality in a Cointegrated VAR
Estrella and Mishkin [1997] use the three variable system of growth rates because nominal
income, the price level, and each of the monetary services indexes are difference stationary.
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Table 7: Granger Causality Tests, cointegrated VAR – Pre-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Price Level MSI
MSI M1 Nom. GDP 0.83 0.96 0.05
Price Level 0.13 0.00 0.66
MSI M1 0.85 0.01 0.00
MSI M2 Nom. GDP 0.59 0.69 0.05
Price Level 0.20 0.00 0.36
MSI M2 0.31 0.04 0.00
MSI MZM Nom. GDP 0.65 0.03 0.01
Price Level 0.26 0.00 0.86
MSI MZM 0.35 0.05 0.00
Nonetheless, since the levels of these variables are cointegrated, it is necessary to estimate
a cointegrated VAR.42 As a method of comparison with the standard VAR above as well as
the analysis of Estrella and Mishkin [1997], the cointegrated VAR is estimated for period
1960 - 1979:3 and 1979:4 - 2005 at quarterly frequencies to capture the policy change that
occurred at the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker. In addition, the cointegrated VAR is
estimated imposing rank(Π) = 1 thereby implying one cointegrating vector as evident from
the trace tests. Granger causality tests are then performed within this context.
The p-values from the Granger causality tests for the pre-1979 sample are shown in Table
7. The p-values are printed such that the null hypothesis is that the column variable does
not predict the row variable. In the pre-Volcker era, one can reject the null hypothesis that
the levels of the monetary services index do not predict nominal income for each measure of
money. However, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the monetary services indexes do
not affect the price level. In fact, the evidence suggests that the price level is only predicted
by its previous values. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the monetary services indexes are
important for predicting nominal spending as implied by the quantity theory of money.
Table 8 reports the p-values from the Granger causality tests for the post-1979 era. Again,
the p-values are printed such that the null hypothesis is that the column variable does not
predict the row variable. The results show that the null hypothesis that money predicts
42The trace statistics are shown in Appendix 1.
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Table 8: Granger Causality Tests, cointegrated VAR – Post-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Price Level MSI
MSI M1 Nom. GDP 0.02 0.62 0.12
Price Level 0.06 0.00 0.28
MSI M1 0.35 0.16 0.00
MSI M2 Nom. GDP 0.00 0.80 0.04
Price Level 0.33 0.00 0.05
MSI M2 0.02 0.02 0.00
MSI MZM Nom. GDP 0.01 0.59 0.01
Price Level 0.01 0.00 0.05
MSI MZM 0.00 0.84 0.00
nominal income cannot be rejected when money is measured by MSI M1. However, this
can be rejected at the 5%-level when money is measured by MSI M2 and at the 1%-level
when measured by MSI MZM. In addition, while one cannot reject the null hypothesis that
money predicts the price level when money is measured by MSI M1, this hypothesis can be
rejected at the 5%-level when money is measured by MSI M2 or MSI MZM. These results
are important because they are once again in contrast to conclusions of Estrella and Mishkin
[1997].
Overall, the results from the Granger causality tests provide evidence that money is
useful in predicting nominal income in the pre-1979 sample and both nominal income and
the price level in the post-1979 sample if money is measured by MSI M2 or MSI MZM. These
results are important because they are in contrast the the previous findings of Estrella and
Mishkin [1997]. Curiously, and again in contrast to Estrella and Mishkin [1997], the results
suggest that the predictive qualities of money might have improved in the post-1979 era at
least in the case of the price level. It is interesting to consider why this might be the case.
Nonetheless, more work is necessary to consider this anomaly.
3.3.4 A Comparison With Simple Sum Aggregates
The previous results can now be compared with those using simple sum aggregates.
Following Estrella and Mishkin [1997], Tables 9 and 10 report the p-values from Granger
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Table 9: Granger Causality Tests – Simple sum, Pre-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Inflation M
M1 Nom.GDP 0.15 0.06 0.01
Inflation 0.45 0.00 0.85
M1 0.55 0.01 0.00
M2 Nom.GDP 0.56 0.01 0.03
Inflation 0.24 0.00 0.08
M2 0.35 0.09 0.00
MZM Nom.GDP 0.86 0.01 0.05
Inflation 0.36 0.00 0.08
MZM 0.03 0.10 0.00
causality tests on the three variable system of nominal income growth, inflation, and money
growth for the pre- and post-1979 eras, respectively. Money growth is now defined by
the simple sum counterparts to the monetary services indexes. Also, given evidence of
cointegration, Tables 11 and 12 report the p-values of Granger causality tests on the three
variable system of nominal income, the price level, and the money stock. The results in each
table are printed such that the null hypothesis is that the column variable does not predict
the row variable.
As shown in Table 9, there is evidence that simple sum M2 and simple sum MZM are
useful in predicting both nominal income growth and inflation in the pre-1979 period. In
addition, simple sum M1 is useful in predicting inflation. These results are largely consistent
with those using the monetary services indexes for the same period. For the post-1979 period,
the simple sum aggregates perform markedly worse. As shown in Table 10, one cannot reject
the null hypothesis that money growth does not predict inflation for any of the simple sum
monetary aggregates. This is in stark contrast to the monetary services indexes, which are
all useful in predicting inflation in the post-1979 period. Only simple sum MZM is useful for
predicting nominal income growth. These results are consistent with those of Estrella and
Mishkin [1997]. However, the differences in performance of the monetary services indexes
and their simple sum counterparts provide evidence for the hypothesis of mismeasurement.
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Table 10: Granger Causality Tests – Simple sum, Post-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Inflation M
M1 Nom. GDP 0.00 0.50 0.23
Inflation 0.02 0.00 0.95
M1 0.11 0.08 0.00
M2 Nom. GDP 0.02 0.37 0.47
Inflation 0.01 0.00 0.91
M2 0.22 0.07 0.00
MZM Nom. GDP 0.00 0.49 0.06
Inflation 0.01 0.00 0.34
MZM 0.05 0.17 0.00
Table 11: Granger Causality Tests, Cointegrated VAR – Simple sum, Pre-1979
Variable Nom.GDP Price Level M
M1 Nom.GDP 0.21 0.72 0.09
Inflation 0.54 0.00 0.72
M1 0.62 0.06 0.01
M2 Nom.GDP 0.12 0.50 0.44
Inflation 0.81 0.02 0.10
M2 0.36 0.15 0.00
MZM Nom.GDP 0.14 0.74 0.09
Inflation 0.65 0.00 0.22
MZM 0.23 0.22 0.00
When the three variable system is expressed in levels rather than growth rates, the
results imply similar conclusions. As shown in Table 11, and consistent with evidence for the
monetary services indexes, simple sumM1 and simple sumMZM are both useful in predicting
nominal income in the pre-1979 period. In contrast to the analysis of the monetary services
indexes, simple sum M2 is no longer useful for predicting nominal income, but is useful in
predicting the price level. As shown in Table 12, simple sum M2 is useful for predicting
the price level, but not nominal income whereas simple sum MZM is useful for predicting
nominal income, but not the price level. Again, this is in contrast to the results outlined
above, in which MSI M2 and MSI MZM were useful for predicting both the price level and
nominal income for the same period.
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Table 12: Granger Causality Tests, Cointegrated VAR – Simple sum, Post-1979
Variable Nom. GDP Price Level M
M1 Nom. GDP 0.02 0.62 0.10
Inflation 0.05 0.00 0.22
M1 0.19 0.15 0.00
M2 Nom. GDP 0.06 0.91 0.62
Inflation 0.03 0.00 0.01
M2 0.05 0.33 0.00
MZM Nom. GDP 0.02 0.36 0.01
Inflation 0.05 0.00 0.89
MZM 0.16 0.31 0.00
Overall, these results are consistent with Estrella and Mishkin [1997] as they demonstrate
that the simple sum monetary aggregates have limited predictive ability. Nonetheless, these
results differ from those using the monetary services indexes as the appropriate measure
of the monetary aggregate. Whereas Estrella and Mishkin [1997] interpret the failures of
the simple sum aggregates as evidence that monetary aggregates are not useful for policy
analysis, the empirical evidence using monetary services indexes coupled with the results in
this section provide evidence that such conclusions are driven by mismeasurement.
3.4 Money and the Output Gap
The final method of empirical analysis is an examination of the role of real money balances
in predicting movements in the output gap. As noted in Chapter 2, money is absent from
contemporary analysis due to both the lack of a dynamic LM equation as well as the fact that
real balances do not appear in the IS equation. The former is absent because it is replaced
in typical analysis by an interest rate rule that governs monetary policy. For inclusion in a
structural IS equation, it is necessary for real balances to be non-separable with consumption
in the utility function. The exclusion of real balances from the IS equation is justified by
the fact that, for reasonable parameterizations of the model, the effect of real balances on
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the output gap would be small in magnitude.43
While there exists a theoretical basis for excluding real money balances from a structural
IS equation, it remains possible that real balances contain information that is important for
explaining the output gap. As discussed in Chapter 2, a key argument among monetarists
is that the demand for real money balances is a function of a number of different asset
prices and not simply the short-term interest rate. As a result, if monetary policy affects
relative prices of financial assets other than the short-term interest rate, real balances are
likely to capture the variety of substitution effects and channels through which monetary
policy works. In this case, real money balances, despite their absence from a structural IS
equation, might still convey information not captured by the short-term interest rate and
therefore might help to predict movements in the output gap.
Empirical analysis of the effect of money on the output gap has been carried out by esti-
mating a backward-looking IS equation. As previously mentioned, Rudebusch and Svensson
[2002] estimate the particular specification given in equation (5) using quarterly data from
1961 - 1996. They find little evidence of a role for money. This paper extends their analysis
in two ways. First, the sample is extended through 2005:4. Second, the model is expanded
to include a one period lag of the quarterly growth rate of real money balances as measured
by the monetary services indexes.
In addition to the estimates over the entire sample, the IS equations are also estimated
for the subsample, 1979:4 - 2005:4. This date is chosen because it is consistent with the
break point identified by Friedman and Kuttner [1992] and Estrella and Mishkin [1997] in
their work described above. What’s more, this date marks the change in monetary policy
beginning with the appointment of Paul Volcker that has been documented by Taylor [1999],
Clarida et al. [2000], and Hendrickson [2010] as well as the beginning of financial deregulation
and innovation. Others, such as Bernanke and Mihov [1998], Leeper and Roush [2003] and
Hafer et al. [2007] use 1983 as the break point. This is justified by the fact that this date
43See Woodford [2003].
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marked the shift from monetary targeting to interest rate targeting as well as shifts in the
velocity of certain simple sum aggregates. Practically, this is not a particularly useful date,
especially for the monetary services indexes, which do not experience structural shifts in
velocity around 1983.
The model is estimated using OLS. The results are shown in Table 13. The first column
are the results reported by Rudebusch and Svensson. The second and third columns re-
estimate the model for the extended sample and the subsample, respectively. In each case,
the output gap is shown to be strongly autoregressive and the real interest rate is shown
to have a negative and significant impact on the output gap. Although there is a slight
reduction in the parameter on the real interest in the subsample beginning in October 1979,
the parameters are relatively constant across samples.
Columns 4 - 9 extend the model to include lagged quarterly growth of real money balances
as measured by MSI M1, MSI M2, and MSI MZM adjusted by the GDP deflator. For the
entire sample real money balances exhibit a positive and significant effect on the output
gap. In the subsample, real MSI M1 does not have a statistically significant effect on the
output gap. However, real balances do have a positive and statistically significant effect on
the output gap when measured by MSI M2 or MSI MZM. In addition, the coefficient on the
real interest rate declines in the subsample when real money balances are included and is not
statistically significant when MSI M2 or MSI MZM is included in the regression. Overall,
these results not only do not support omitting real money balances from IS equations, but
also suggests that the exclusion of money leaves the estimated IS equations misspecified.
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3.5 Conclusion
The emerging consensus is that monetary aggregates are not useful in monetary policy
and business cycle analysis. This view has largely been justified by empirical work that
shows that the demand for money is unstable and that money does not help to explain
fluctuations in the output gap. Modern business cycle theorists have used these results to
develop models that completely abstract from money. At the core of these models is the
dynamic New Keynesian IS-LM-type model where the LM curve has been replaced by an
interest rate rule followed by the central bank. Money is inconsequential to the model as it
merely reflects movements in the interest rate. In other words, money is redundant.
One potential problem with the empirical results that justify these cashless models is that
they rely on the use of simple sum monetary aggregates. Such aggregates are theoretically
flawed in that they treat all components of a particular aggregate as perfect substitutes; a
result inconsistent with empirical evidence. Thus, previous results that employ simple sum
aggregates are potentially flawed by mismeasurement.
As a result, this chapter re-examines the empirical findings of previous authors by using
monetary services indexes rather than the simple sum counterparts. The advantage of using
the monetary services index is that it is derived from microtheoretic foundations and is
consistent with aggregation and index number theory. Using this alternative measure of
money, this paper identifies a stable money demand function for each component class of
monetary assets across samples. In addition, it demonstrates that real money balances
not only have a positive and significant impact on the output gap, but that this effect is
often larger in magnitude than that of the real interest rate. Overall, the results suggest
that previous findings are likely the result of mismeasurement with regards to monetary
aggregates.
59
Chapter 4 Monetary Transmission in the New Keyne-
sian Framework
A key implication of the New Keynesian model is that the monetary transmission mech-
anism is solely captured by the path of the short term interest rate. Both monetarists
and advocates of the credit channel argue that the interest rate is insufficient to capture the
transmission process. This chapter extends the baseline New Keynesian model to incorporate
these other mechanisms and compares the results of the model to empirical characteristics
observed in the data.
4.1 Extending the Model
This chapter extends the baseline New Keynesian model in two directions. First, following
Cuthbertson and Taylor [1987], Christiano et al. [1998], and Nelson [2002], it is assumed that
there is disutility associated with adjusting real money balances. Under this assumption,
the money demand function has desirable properties, specifically dependence on permanent
income, the long term interest rate, and lagged real balances.
Second, following Carlstrom et al. [2010], the model introduces agency costs such that
the model includes endogenously determined asset prices and net worth.44 The addition of
agency costs is important because it creates an additional channel for the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism as emphasized by the credit channel literature. What’s more, it represents
an important extension to the work of Nelson [2002] by incorporating additional financial
assets to the model; a characteristic often emphasized in the work of Brunner and Meltzer
[1989, 1993].
The following subsections discuss each modification in more detail.
44The present model modifies the framework of the previous authors by introducing an alternative as-
sumption about the characteristics of the entrepreneurs. In the absence of this alternative assumption, the
addition of agency costs does not affect the response of the output gap to a monetary shock. This is because
the previous authors assume that entrepreneurs do not consume and, as a result, agency costs only affect
net worth and asset prices. This is discussed in more detail below.
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4.1.1 Money Demand
The first extension to the New Keynesian model is to assume that there are small costs in
the form of disutility associated with adjusting real money balances. For example, Brunner
et al. [1980], Brunner et al. [1983], and Meltzer [1998] suggest that agents will only want to
adjust real balances if exogenous shocks are expected to persist. Formally, this is consistent
with habit persistence in the level of real money balances. In this case, the representative
agent would seek to smooth movements in real balances over time to prevent the problem
of sudden movements to real balances caused by exogenous shocks.45 Given the preference
to smooth money balances, it is assumed that there is disutility associated with changing
money balances.
Ultimately, the cost of adjustment is assumed to be small, but existent.46 This approach
also has desirable features as it implies that there is a dynamic adjustment in the demand
for real money balances and that real balances are dependent on long run expectations of
the interest rate and income. Each of these characteristics is justified below.
The existence of a dynamic adjustment is an implicit, and often neglected, characteristic
of typical empirical approach to money demand. To illustrate this consider a cointegrated
vector autoregressive (VAR) model typically used in money demand analysis:
∆xt = Γ1∆xt−1 + · · ·+ Γk∆xt−k + αβ′xt−1 + εt
where α is the adjustment matrix and β′ is the cointegrating matrix. The former contains
short run adjustment parameters whereas the latter explains long run relations. Thus, the
45This would seem to be consistent with the role of money as a ”temporary abode of purchasing power”
as in Friedman and Schwartz [1982] in which money is valued beyond its role for transactions purposes
and is held as part of a portfolio of assets. In this regard, partial adjustment in real money balances is
not necessarily a quintessential monetarist point. For example, as Niehans [1978] explains, “The difference
between desired and actual stocks [is] called excess demand . . . Excess demand refers . . . to the fact that
more rapid adjustment of assets may be more expensive than slow adjustment, so that the indivdual finds it
efficient to spread the adjustment over time. This approach to asset accumulation is familiar from investment
and portfolio analysis.” This concept remains relevant to empirical analysis of money demand as outlined
below.
46The precise size of the cost is discussed in the calibration section below.
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impetus behind the use of the cointegrated VAR model in the analysis of money demand
is that it allows for a direct examination of the long run relationship between real money
balances, a scale variable of economic activity, and a price variable such as an interest rate.
Specifically, the nature of this relationship can be examined by testing for cointegration of
the variables as well as testing restrictions on the cointegrating vector, β, associated with a
cointegrating relation. For example, if a stable money demand function exists, this would
imply the following:
β′xt = mt − β0 − βyyt − βrRt = 0
where mt is real balances, yt is the scale variable, and Rt is the interest rate. Even when such
a relationship holds, however, at any point in time there might exist a vector xt = [mt, yt, Rt]
′
such that β′xt 6= 0. As such, one might alternatively express β′xt as:
mt −m∗t
wheremt is actual real balances andm
∗
t = β0+βyyt+βrRt represents desired money balances.
Returning to the cointegrated VAR, maintaining the definition that β′xt = mt−m∗t , and
suppressing lagged differences, the model can be re-written:

∆mt
∆yt
∆Rt
 =

α1
α2
α3
 [(mt −m∗t )] + · · ·+

ε1,t
ε2,t
ε3,t

Through simple algebraic manipulation the real money balances equation can then be ex-
pressed as:
mt =
(
1 + α1
)
mt−1 − α1m∗t + · · ·+ ε1,t
where α1 ≤ 0. This relation thus bears a strong resemblance to the dynamic adjustment
approach of Goldfeld [1973].
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Using this framework, the speed of adjustment of actual real money balances toward
the desired level of real balances can be estimated directly. This characteristic is important
because if individuals are able to accurately perceive the shocks and the costs of adjustment
are sufficiently small, one would expect the adjustment parameter, α1 to be sufficiently close
to unity in absolute value such that actual real money balances would immediately adjust
to their desired level; a result not documented by empirical evidence.
As a result of the implications illustrated above, it seems justified to assume that there
are small costs associated with changes in real money balances. Returning to the theoretical
proposition, suppose that the following utility function is maximized subject to a typical
budget constraint:
U = βt
[(
Ct
1− σ
)1−σ
+
(
mt
1− m
)1−m
+ · · · − φm
2
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)2]
where Ct is consumption, mt is real money balances, and σ, m, and φm are parameters.
Maximization yields the following first order condition expressed in log-deviations:
λt = −σCt
mt + α∆mt − βα∆mt+1 + 1
m
(λt +Rt) = 0
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier, Rt is the nominal interest rate, and α is a parameter.
Combing first order conditions and solving forward to eliminate the unstable root, as in
Sargent (1987), the money demand equation can then be expressed as:
mt = µ1mt−1 + (βam)−1
[ ∞∑
i=0
(µ2)
−(i+1)
(
σ
m
yt+i − 1
m
Rt+i
)]
(8)
where µ1 is the dynamic adjustment parameter and is a nonlinear function of α and β.
This money demand function has the desirable properties that it is both a function of the
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long term interest rate as well as permanent income as implied by Friedman (1956).47 The
appearance of the long term interest rate in the money demand function is consistent with
propositions of monetarists such as Friedman [1956] and Meltzer [1998]. In addition, if the
long term interest rate is present in the money demand function, it is possible that real money
balances might convey additional information not explained by the short term interest rate
adjusted by monetary policy as emphasized by in the monetarist transmission mechanism
discussed above.
4.1.2 Agency Costs
The second addition to the model is the introduction of agency costs. Following Carlstrom
et al. [2010], the framework is extended in two important directions. First, the representative
household provides two types of labor. Second, the representative entrepreneur hires each
type of labor to produce an intermediate good. However, the choice of one type of labor
is subject to a collateral constraint due to information asymmetries in the labor market.
Constrained optimization therefore implies that one input is financed in a matter consistent
to an intratemporal loan with a credit distortion.
These two modifications introduce important aspects to the model. First, it can be shown
that the credit distortion is positively related to the output-net worth ratio consistent with
a financial accelerator model. Second, the model is isomorphic to a costly state verification
framework used in previous agency cost models.48 Finally, and most importantly, the ex-
istence of agency costs generates endogenously determined asset prices and net worth. As
a result, the model incorporates elements of the asset price channel and the credit channel
emphasized in the literature discussed above.
The addition of agency costs in this framework is similar to the models used by Curd´ıa
and Woodford [2008] and DeFiore and Tristani [2009], who also extend the baseline New
Keynesian model to include some type of credit friction in order to determine optimal mone-
47Note that in the baseline New Keynesian model yt = ct.
48See the appendix to Carlstrom et al. [2010].
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tary policy. Curd´ıa and Woodford [2008] extend the baseline model to include a time-varying
interest rate spread between borrowing rates and saving rates by considering the case of two
types households, which differ according to their ”relative impatience to consume” (Curd´ıa
and Woodford [2008]: 8). These households are free to adjust their type. As a result, there
is a reason for financial intermediation. The financial friction arises because households are
only able to engage in financial contracting through the intermediary sector, which incurs
a real resource cost through intermediation.49 This resource cost generates an equilibrium
spread between borrowing and deposit rates. What’s more, it is assumed that this spread is
also subject to an exogenous mark-up shocks analogous to a financial shock.
DeFiore and Tristani [2009] introduce credit frictions through the use of a costly state
verification framework. In their model, firms have asymmetric information and must raise
external funds in order to pay their labor force in advance of production. If the firms generate
sufficient revenue from production, they pay back their debt and use any remaining profits
for consumption. As implied by the costly state verification framework, a firm that fails to
generate sufficient revenue defaults on the debt and the output that was produced is taken by
the financial intermediary. Credit frictions arise as a result of the monitoring cost associated
with the borrowing of external funds.
These models differ from the present analysis in a number of important respects. For
example, both models neglect the endogenous role of net worth and asset prices. Curd´ıa and
Woodford [2008] offer only one endogenous mechanism through which the credit spread can
be effected. What’s more, these authors explicitly assume that the monetary transmission
mechanism is much the same as in the baseline New Keynesian model. Despite the fact
that the interest rate spread affects both the IS equation and the Phillips curve relation,
the spread effectively only affects the dynamics of the model through a new additive term
in each equation akin to a new exogenous disturbance. As a result, the model relies on the
49Households are also able to agree to state-contingent insurance contracts against aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic risk, but do not have access to the insurance market every period. This enables aggregation in their
model while maintaining a meaningful financial friction.
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traditional interest rate channel of monetary transmission in which the future path of the
policy interest rate is all that matters.
DeFiore and Tristani [2009] assume that entrepreneurial net worth is exogenous and
given as an endowment each period. This similarly has important implications for the
monetary transmission mechanism. Most notably, the existence of exogenous net worth
implies that the model is not consistent with the typical literature on the credit channel, in
which endogenous movements in net worth propagate monetary disturbances. In contrast,
monetary policy affects financial decisions because the contract is priced in nominal terms.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Household
The representative household supplies two types of labor, Lt and ut, in exchange for real
wages, wt and rt, respectively. In addition, the household holds interest yielding bonds,
Bt−1, money balances, Mt−1, and shares of the intermediate goods producing firm, et−1, at
the beginning of the period. The household uses the income generated from supplying labor
and the value of its asset holdings to finance consumption and re-allocate its portfolio in the
present period. The household budget constraint can be expressed in real terms as:
wtLt + rtut + (1 +Rt−1)bt−1 +mt−1 + et−1(qt + dt) = ct + bt +mt + qtet (9)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate, qt is the real price of a share of the intermediate goods
producing firm, and dt is the real dividend paid by the intermediate goods producing firm.
The households utility function is given by:
U(C,L, u,m) = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
C1−σt
1− σ −
L1+θt
1 + θ
− u
1+θ
t
1 + θ
+
m1−mt
1− m −
ϕm
2
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)2}
where ϕm is a parameter that measures the cost of portfolio adjustment associated with
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changing real money balances and β is the discount factor. This utility function and the
existence of two types of labor can be justified as an aggregation procedure in which there are
heterogeneous households that differ only in the sense that they provide two, distinct types
of labor so long as the households insure one another against risk in terms of consumption.
The household maximizes utility subject to (9). Constrained maximization yields:
λt = C
−σ
t (10)
Lθt = λtwt (11)
uθt = λtrt (12)
m−mt − ϕm
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)
1
mt−1
− ϕm
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)
mt+1
m2t
+ βEt
λt+1
pit+1
= λt (13)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1
(1 +Rt) = λt (14)
βEtλt+1(qt+1 + dt+1) = λtqt (15)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Solving to eliminate the Langrangian multiplier yields
two labor supply curves, a money demand function, a dynamic IS equation, and an asset
demand function.
4.2.2 Entrepreneur
The representative entrepreneur uses two types of labor, L and u, to produce good x and
sells the good for price p. The entrepreneur earns profits from production to purchase shares
of the intermediate goods producing firm and for consumption. The entrepreneur thus solves
two problems – a profit-maximization problem and a utility maximization problem. This
differs from the model used by Carlstrom et al. [2010] as that model imposes the assumption
that a fraction of entrepreneurs die each period and, as a result, entrepreneurial consumption
is zero in equilibrium. This assumption assures that the collateral constraint is binding. Un-
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fortunately, this limits the effects of agency costs to fluctuations in asset prices and net worth
and fails to differentiate the output dynamics of the model from a baseline New Keynesian
model.50 This model adopts the assumption that entrepreneurs have a higher discount rate
than the representative household in order to ensure that the collateral constraint is binding
and that entrepreneurial consumption is non-zero in equilibrium. Without this assumption,
the entrepreneur would simply forego hiring workers of type L until accumulating enough
net worth to fully cover the wage bill.
The entrepreneur produces output using the following production function:
xt = L
α
t u
1−α
t (16)
and purchases quantities of each type of labor from the household in competitive markets.
A useful interpretation of this production function is as follows. Suppose that two distinct
entrepreneur types exist. One of the entrepreneurs uses type-L labor in production and is
subject to a collateral constraint. The other entrepreneur type uses type-u labor in pro-
duction and faces no constraint. The production function can therefore be rationalized as
a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of production in which the fraction of entrepreneurs using the
L-type of labor is given by α.51
The entrepreneur thus chooses Lt and ut to maximize profits given by:
Profits = ptxt − rtut − wtLt (17)
50It does generate important differences in welfare. Since the previous authors were conducting welfare
analysis for alternate monetary policy rules, this is not a critique of their methods. Nonetheless, their
assumption is not reasonable for the present analysis.
51This interpretation is useful in the calibration below.
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where the choice of labor is made subject to the collateral constraint:52
wtLt ≤ g(nwt, ptxt − rtut) ≡ nwbt (ptxt − rtut)1−b (18)
Where nwt = et−1(qt+ dt) is entrepreneurial net worth and (ptxt− rtut) are profits obtained
without the use of the L-type of labor. The collateral constraint implies that the entrepreneur
backs up the wage agreement with L-type labor suppliers with his net worth and the profits
from using the u-type of labor.
Maximizing (17) in which equation (18) is a binding constraint for the choice of L yields
the following optimization conditions:
rtut = (1− α)ptxt (19)
wtLt(1 + bφt) = αptxt (20)
where φt is the Lagrangian multiplier from the constrained optimization problem.
Equations (19) and (20) reveal the nature of the credit market friction employed in this
model. In comparison to the unconstrained choice, the optimization condition given by
equation (20) is analogous to the case in which the entrepreneur must borrow funds at a
real interest rate, in this case given by bφt, in order to pay L-type workers at the beginning
of the period. The loan is subsequently paid off at the end of the period. In this case, bφt
represents an endogenous credit distortion, akin to an external finance premium, that is a
function of the ratio of output to net worth.53 Consistent with the literature on the credit
52This constraint is desirable because, as Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian show, it is isomorphic to the
costly state verification framework used in Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997], Carlstrom and Fuerst [1998] and
other agency cost literature.
53Assuming that the collateral constraint is binding, one can combine the collateral constraint with the
optimization conditions to yield:
bφt =
(
αptxt
nwt
)b
− 1
The parameter b measures the sensitivity of the finance premium to the output-net worth ratio. For the case
in which b = 0, the external finance premium collapse to zero. Details are shown in Appendix 2.
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channel, a decline in net worth induced by a change in monetary policy results in a larger
credit distortion and a corresponding increase in the cost of hiring workers of type L.
Finally, by substituting the optimization conditions given in equations (19) and (20)
into the profit equation (17), one can derive the equilibrium level of profits earned by the
entrepreneur:
Profitst = αptxt
(
bφt
1 + bφt
)
Thus, the existence of a collateral constraint for L-type labor implies that the entrepreneur
yields a positive level of profits.
Like the household, the entrepreneur also buys and sells shares of the intermediate goods
producing firm. The entrepreneur uses the value of the shares carried over from the previous
period, the income generated through the collection of the corresponding dividends, and the
profits generated by production to finance consumption and the purchase of shares in the
present period. The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is therefore given by:
cet + etqt = et−1(qt + dt) + profits (21)
Using the definition of net worth combined with the optimization conditions, the collateral
constraint, and the equilibrium level of profits, this budget constraint can be re-written:
cet + etqt = αptxtF (φt) (22)
where:
F (φt) =
[(
bφt
1 + bφt
)
+
(
1
1 + bφt
) 1
b
]
The entrepreneur then chooses consumption, ce, and the fraction of shares, e, to maximize
utility:
U(ce) = Et
∞∑
t=0
(βγ)tcet
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subject to the budget constraint above. Here, γ is an additional discount factor that ensures
that the collateral constraint is binding. Constrained maximization yields the entrepreneur’s
intertemporal Euler equation:
qt = βγEt(qt+1 + dt+1)(1 + bφt+1) (23)
4.2.3 Final Goods Producing Firm
The final good producing firm is perfectly competitive and produces, yt. The firm pur-
chases yt(j) units from firm j ∈ [0, 1] at price Pt(j). The final good is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate of intermediate goods:
yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
yt(j)
(ε−1)/εdj
]ε/(ε−1)
(24)
where −ε is the price elasticity of demand for yt(j).
The final goods producing firm maximizes profits:
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)yt(j)dj (25)
subject to (24). This gives the following demand function for the each intermediate good:
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
yt (26)
Since the final goods producing firm is perfectly competitive it earns zero profits. Thus,
combining (26) and (25), yields the price index:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−εdj
]1/(1−ε)
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4.2.4 Intermediate Goods Producing Firm
The intermediate good producing firm is monopolistically competitive and purchases a
quantity of the entrepreneurial good xt(j) in a perfectly competitive market at price pt from
the entrepreneur and combine technology, at to produce yt(j).
54 Under cost minimization,
the firm would thus choose xt(j) to minimize:
ptxt(j) (27)
subject to:
yt(j) = atxt(j) (28)
The first order condition is given by:
pt = ztat (29)
where zt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Substituting this into (27) yields:
ztyt(j)
where the Lagrangian multiplier can now be interpreted as the real marginal cost.
The intermediate goods producing firm is monopolistically competitive and chooses its
price. However, there is a cost of adjusting the price when the change differs from the
steady state inflation rate. Following Rotemberg [1982], the quadratic cost of nominal price
adjustment and expressed in terms of final output:
ϕp
2
(
Pt(j)
piPt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
where ϕp measures the size of the price adjustment cost. Higher values of ϕp indicate greater
price stickiness.
54Where xt =
∫ 1
0
xt(j)dj
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The intermediate goods firm seeks to maximize the real present discounted marginal
utility value of the dividend that it pays out from its profits:
Et
[ ∞∑
i=0
βiλt+i
Dt+i(j)
Pt+j
]
where the real value of the dividend is given by;
Dt(j)
Pt
=
Pt(j)
Pt
yt(j)− ztyt(j)− ϕp
2
(
Pt(j)
piPt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
Using this definition of the value of the dividend as well as the demand for yt given by
(26), the intermediate goods producing firm chooses its price Pt(j) to solve the following
unconstrained maximization model:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiλt+i
[(
Pt+i(j)
Pt+i
)1−ε
yt+i − zt+i
(
Pt+i(j)
Pt+i
)−ε
yt+i − ϕp
2
(
Pt+i(j)
piPt+i−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt+i
]
(30)
Using the fact that, in equilibrium, zt and yt are the same for all intermediate goods
firms, Pt(j) = Pt. Defining pit = Pt/Pt−1, and multiplying the first-order condition from the
unconstrained maximization problem by pt/yt, one can derive the marginal cost version of
the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
(1− ε)λt + ελtzt − ϕp
(
pit
pi
− 1
)(
pit
pi
)
+ βϕpEt
[
λt+1
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)(
pit+1
pi
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
= 0 (31)
The firm is monopolistically competitive and, as such, earns a profit. It uses the profit
to pay a dividend to shareholders given, in real terms, by:
dt = atxt(1− zt) (32)
Technology, at, used by the intermediate goods firm is exogenous and is expressed in
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log-deviations by:
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + νˆat
where E(νa) = 0 and SD(νa) = σνa .
4.2.5 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a Taylor rule. This is expressed
in log-deviations as:
Rˆt = φpipˆit + φy˜ ˆ˜y + ˆ
R
t (33)
where R is the nominal interest rate, pi is the inflation rate, y˜ is the output gap, and R is
the monetary shock.
4.2.6 Closing the Model
In equilibrium, yt(j) = yt, Pt(j) = Pt, xt(j) = xt.
The goods market equilibrium is given by:
yt = ct + c
e
t
The change in real balances is defined as:
∆mt =
mt
mt−1
Finally, the output gap (expressed in log-devations) is defined as:
ˆ˜yt = yˆt − yˆnt
where
yˆnt =
(
1 + θ
σ + θ
)
aˆt
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Using the fact that pt = ztat, yt = atxt, and substituting equation (10) into the remaining
household first-order conditions to eliminate the Lagrangian multiplier, the four equation
above and equations (11) - (15), (16), (18) - (20), (22), (23), (31) - (33) are sufficient to solve
for c, L, w, u, r, R, pi, q, d, ce, e, z, y, φ, m, ∆m, y˜, and yn.
4.2.7 A Note on Simplifying the Model
The present model nests the baseline New Keynesian model as a special case and facili-
tates a direct comparison with that framework. Under the assumption that α = 0, the L-type
of labor is not used in production and the collateral constraint is of no significance. It can
be shown that the model reduces to the baseline New Keynesian framework with the notable
exception that the money demand function remains forward-looking. However, setting the
parameter am = 0 reduces the money demand function to the standard, static model posited
in the baseline New Keynesian model.55 By imposing one of these assumptions at a time,
one can contrast the dynamics of each extension to the model.
4.3 Simulation and Results
4.3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated as follows. The parameters related to the household problem
are either chosen to be in line with the literature or are implied by the estimation of a
money demand function consistent with equation (8) above. The discount factor β is set to
0.99, which is consistent throughout the business cycle literature. Quarterly estimates for the
demand for the real MSI M2 using a cointegrated VAR suggest that the income/consumption
elasticity is equal to 0.64 and the interest elasticity is -0.38.56 As a result, m is set to 2.5 and
σ is set to equal 1.6 in order to remain roughly consistent with equation (8). In addition,
55For example, as in Gal´ı (2008: 43).
56MSI M2 is the monetary services index counterpart to simple sum M2. This aggregate is used because
it is consistent with economic, index number, and aggregation theory and is shown in Chapter 3, along with
MSI MZM, to have a statistically significant impact on the output gap. The estimates are taken from that
paper. Similar results can be obtained for the real monetary base.
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µ1 is estimated to be around 0.95, which is consistent with the quarterly estimates of the
reduced form models in Taylor [1993].57 Consistent with Nelson [2002], am is set equal to
10, which implies that µ1 = .7, which is a slightly more conservative estimate. This value
combined with m implies that the cost of portfolio adjustment, ϕm = 22. Finally, the inverse
Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to unity. This is consistent with the estimates in Fiorito
and Zanella [2008] and the calibration of Gali [2008].
The parameters for the sticky price firm are chosen to be consistent with the literature.
The sticky price literature assumes that the steady state mark up is between 10% and 40%.
Since the markup can be expressed as the inverse of marginal cost, ε is set equal to 10, which
implies a steady state markup of 11%. In addition, the cost of adjustment parameter for
price changes, ϕp, is set to 173.08, which implies that the coefficient on marginal cost in the
Phillips curve equals 0.05. Also, as shown in Keen and Wang [2005], the price adjustment
parameter and the steady state markup are equivalent to a Calvo-type [1983] specification
in which prices are adjusted approximately every 5 quarters.
The calibrated parameters for the entrepreneur are α and b as well as the steady state
values of φ and e. Recalling that the entrepreneur’s production function is analogous to a
Cobb-Douglas aggregation of collateral constrained entrepreneurs and their unconstrained
counterparts, α is chosen to reflect the fraction of small firms likely to be collateral con-
strained. Following Carlstrom et al. [2010], α is set to 0.5, which is the fraction of employ-
ment in firms of 500 employees or less. Also, the isomorphism of the collateral constraint to
a costly state verification model implies that b = 0.2 and that bφss = 0.026.
58 Finally, since
the supply of shares is normalized to unity in equilibrium, ess is the fraction of shares held
by the entrepreneur in the steady state. This value is set to 0.04 such that the steady state
entrepreneurial consumption share of output is 0.01.59 In the present model, agency costs
57Taylor’s estimates are for real M1. The estimates of Anderson and Rasche [2001] for the demand for
the real monetary base suggest µ1 = 0.82. However, that result is for annual data. A more conservative
estimate is chosen because the cointegrated VAR is estimated with contemporaneous data rather than the
expected values implied by the theory.
58For details, see the appendix to Carlstrom et al. [2010].
59For details, see Appendix 2.
76
affect output through entrepreneurial consumption. This value of ess is therefore chosen to
ensure that the entrepreneurial consumption share of output is small and, as a result, that
additional output effects are not simply assumed to be large.60
The parameters of the monetary policy rule are set to be consistent with the Taylor
rule (φpi = 1.5 and φy˜ = 0.5). The monetary policy shock is assumed to follow an AR(1)
process with a coefficient of 0.4 and an innovation standard deviation of 0.002, which is
consistent with McCallum [2008] and McCallum and Nelson [1999]. The technology shock is
also assumed to be an AR(1) process with a coefficient of 0.95 and an innovation standard
deviation of 0.007, which is consistent with the real business cycle literature.
4.3.2 Evaluation
Perhaps as important as the articulation of the model is the method of evaluation. Tra-
ditionally, monetary models are evaluated by the quantitative and qualitative features of
impulse response functions. In contrast, this paper takes a different approach.61 First, fol-
lowing McCallum [2001b], this paper evaluates the model by the comparison of the second
moments and autocorrelations of the model with those found in the data. This type of
analysis is especially important for examining the monetary transmission mechanism as it
captures the effects of systematic monetary policy and not simply the effects of unanticipated
shocks. This is important, as McCallum [2001b] notes, because systematic policy would seem
to be more relevant for analyzing the monetary transmission mechanism as the unsystem-
atic component explains only a very small fraction of the movement in the monetary policy
instrument.62
As a second method of analysis, IS-type equations are estimated from simulated data sets
60The results presented below are not sensitive to the calibration. Sensitivity analysis is contained in
Appendix 3.
61Impulse response functions can be found in Appendix 3.
62This evaluation procedure is by no means new to the literature. For example, the use of second moments
can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] and has long been prevalent in real business cycle research
as well. In addition, Fuhrer and Moore [1995], Fuhrer [2000], and Estrella and Fuhrer [2002] employ vector
autocorrelations to evaluate the model.
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Table 14: Standard Deviations (in %)
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate
1954:3 - 2009:4 2.46 2.22 3.36
1979:4 - 2009:4 2.30 1.71 3.81
Agency Cost Model 2.52 2.29 2.18
New Keynesian Model 0.14 0.18 0.32
generated by the model. These estimates are carried out because the traditional monetarist
view of the transmission mechanism predicts that real money balances are an important
information variable for predicting movements in real output independent of the policy in-
terest rate or some real balance effect. These estimates therefore provide a direct examination
of whether real balances are important for the monetary transmission mechanism without
assuming that they enter the structural IS equation in the model.
The first method of evaluating the systematic effects of monetary policy adjustment in
the model is to compare the second moments in the data to those predicted by the model.
Table 14 shows the standard deviations of the output gap, inflation, and the federal funds
rate for the period 1954:3 - 2009:4 and the sub-period 1979:4 - 2009:4. The latter period is
chosen to coincide with the beginning of Paul Volcker’s chairmanship at the Federal Reserve.
The output gap is measured by the percentage deviation of real GDP from the Congressional
Budget Office’s estimate of potential GDP, inflation is measured as the annual percentage
change in the GDP deflator, and the interest rate is measured by the quarterly average of
the federal funds rate at an annual percent.
The third and fourth rows in Table 14 list the corresponding standard deviations for
the agency cost model employed in this paper and the baseline New Keynesian model, re-
spectively.63 As shown, the agency cost model is able to reproduce the standard deviations
observed for the whole sample quite well. For the sub-period, the model’s simulation is less
favorable, but only moderately so. In contrast, the standard deviations in the New Keyne-
63It is important to note that the existence of adjustment costs for real money balances does not have a
bearing on these results because money is not a state variable in the analysis.
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Table 15: First- and Second-order Autocorrelations
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate
1954:3 - 2009:4 0.92 0.97 0.95
0.79 0.93 0.88
1979:4 - 2009:4 0.93 0.84 0.94
0.81 0.66 0.87
Agency Cost Model 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
New Keynesian Model 0.52 0.94 0.89
0.32 0.88 0.81
sian model are much too small to be consistent with those observed in the data. This latter
result is consistent with the findings of McCallum [2008], who uses a slightly different spec-
ification of the baseline New Keynesian model.64 The agency cost model therefore performs
unequivocally better than the New Keynesian model in this regard.
The second method of evaluating the systematic component of monetary policy is to
consider the behavior of the autocorrelation functions for each of the same three variables
above. Table 15 lists the first- and second-order autocorrelations and Figure 16 plots the
autocorrelation functions of the output gap, inflation, and the interest rate, respectively,
from the entire sample as well as for each model.
As shown in Table 15, each model is able to replicate the autocorrelations of inflation and
the short term interest rate quite well.65 The major difference between the two models is in
regards to the behavior of the output gap. The agency cost model is able to generate first-
and second-order autocorrelations consistent with the data. However, the autocorrelations
generated from the New Keynesian model are substantially smaller than those observed in
64McCallum adds a preference shock to the IS equation. This increases the variability of the variables,
but they are still much lower than the data for a variety of monetary policy rules. Specifically, the standard
deviations of output and inflation are less than unity in that model for the same monetary policy rule.
65The ability of the baseline New Keynesian model to replicate the persistence of inflation is contrary to the
findings of Nelson [1998] and Estrella and Fuhrer [2002]. Nelson examines a variety of model specifications.
Estrella and Fuhrer examine the baseline New Keynesian model as outlined and estimated in McCallum
and Nelson [1999]. That model only differs from the model above in that it includes an IS shock of the
form: εISt = 0.3ε
IS
t−1 + vt where Etvt = 0 and SD(vt) = 0.01. Modifying the model above to include this
specification results in a significant decline in the persistence of inflation, the details of which can be found
in Appendix 3.
79
the data.
Figure 16: Autocorrelation Functions
Figure 16 plots the autocorrelation functions for the New Keynesian model, the agency
cost model, and the data. Standard error bands for the autocorrelation functions in the
data are shown by the dotted lines. As the results shown in Table 15 suggest, each model
is able to replicate the autocorrelations of inflation and the interest rate quite well. Again,
the difference in the performance of the models is illustrated in the behavior of the output
gap. The New Keynesian model performs poorly in this regard as the entire autocorrelation
function is outside the standard error band of that observed in the data. In contrast, the
agency cost model performs better along this dimension as the autocorrelation function
remains within the standard error bands through the third-order autocorrelation and is
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more persistent than the data thereafter.
Thus, the baseline New Keynesian model is unable to capture the persistence of the
output gap evident in the data. When the model is amended to include agency costs,
however, it is capable of capturing the persistence of the output gap reasonably well. Again,
this suggests that the agency cost model is better able to replicate the empirical properties
observed in the data.
The final method of analysis is to estimate a backward-looking IS-type equation using
data generated from simulations of the model to determine the effects of monetary policy on
aggregate demand. This equation is of the form:
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2Rt−1 + β3∆mt−1 + et (34)
where y is output, R is the nominal interest rate, and ∆m is the change in real money
balances. Given the fact that the data are generated by a model in which real money balances
are absent from the structural IS equation, these estimates represent a direct test of the
monetarist transmission mechanism in which movements in real money balances reflect the
substitution effects as a result of the relative price adjustments that follow a monetary shock.
In addition, since the nominal interest rate is solely determined by monetary policy, this
model is able to determine whether real balances contain any information not communicated
by movements in the central bank’s policy instrument. It may seem strange to use the
nominal interest rate rather than the real rate as it is the latter that enters the structural
IS equation. However, the point of estimation is to determine to role of real balances in the
monetary transmission mechanism. In a model with sticky prices and in which monetary
policy satisfies the Taylor principle, inflation expectations will be anchored and movements
in the nominal interest rate will cause corresponding changes in the real rate of interest.66,67
66In fact, the coefficient estimates obtained for the U.S. data below are quite similar in magnitude to the
estimates in Chapter 3, in which the real interest rate specification is used.
67For the same reason, the nominal federal funds rate is frequently used in the VAR literature. In addition,
given the fact that the baseline model contains two exogenous shocks – technology and monetary – and the
standard deviation of the technology shock is two and one-half times that of the monetary shock, movements
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To estimate equation (34), each model is simulated 100 times to generate a time series
that spans 200 quarters. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics that are reported are
the averages across simulations. The results for each model and the corresponding money
demand specification are shown in Table 16 alongside results estimated from U.S. data.
The results of estimating equation (34) using U.S. data are obtained using linearly de-
trended real gross domestic product as the measure of output, the interest rate is measured
by the federal funds rate, and the change in real balances is measured by the quarterly
change in MSI M2 for the period 1979:4 - 2005:4.68 This time period is chosen because
it represents a time in which monetary policy has satisfied the Taylor principle.69 These
estimates are calculated using ordinary least squares with Newey-West standard errors as
initial estimation indicated serial correlation.
in the real interest rate are likely to be dominated by shocks to technology. As such, a broader specification
of the exogenous structure would be necessary to consider changes in the real rate. This, however, would
represent a departure from the baseline New Keynesian model and is therefore not carried out presently. An
example of this type of analysis in a broader model can be found in Nelson [2002], who identifies a positive
and significant effect of changes in real balances on aggregate demand controlling for the real rate.
68The data was obtained through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database.
69See for example Clarida et al. [2000] and Taylor [1999]. The end period of 2005 is chosen because it is
the most recent year in which monetary services index data is available.
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The coefficient estimates from U.S. data show that the federal funds rate has a negative
and significant impact on de-trended output. When the change in real MSI M2 is included
in the analysis, real balances are found to have a positive and statistically significant impact
on de-trended output. In this latter specification, the coefficient on the federal funds rate
remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant.70 The existence of a positive and
significant impact of real balances on de-trended output provides evidence for the monetarist
transmission mechanism.
The agency cost model does a reasonable job of reproducing these results. For example,
for the specification that excludes real money balances, the coefficient on the policy interest
rate is statistically significant and close in magnitude to that estimated in U.S. data. What’s
more, the results show that real money balances exert a positive and statistically significant
impact on output when the model employs a forward-looking money demand specification.
Although the magnitude of the effect is larger in the model than in U.S. data, this latter
result is important because it provides evidence for the monetarist transmission mechanism
similarly identified in the data, but also suggests that the specification of money demand is
important to the conclusions generated from the model. Outright exclusions of money based
on the static money demand specification thus appear misplaced.
In contrast to the agency cost model, the New Keynesian model predicts that increases
in the nominal interest rate have a positive and statistically significant impact on de-trended
output regardless of whether adjustment costs are present. What’s more, the coefficient
on the the change in real money balances is not statistically significant for either money
demand specification. Also, it is important to note that the estimation results from the
New Keynesian model are not dependent on inclusion of real balances in estimation. The
coefficient on the policy interest rate remains positive and significant when real balances are
excluded. This is contrary to both the predictions of the model and the estimation results
from U.S. data.
70This is consistent with the findings of Chapter 3 where the real interest rate specification is used.
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These results are important because a key prediction of the New Keynesian model is
that the short term interest rate exclusively provides information about monetary policy.
Under the assumption of sticky prices, changes in the nominal interest rate should lead to
corresponding changes in the real interest rate and therefore have an impact on aggregate
demand as implied by the structural, dynamic IS equation. Thus, one would expect that
the short term interest rate controlled by the monetary authority to be negatively related to
output. However, using data generated from the baseline New Keynesian model, estimation
of the backward-looking IS-type equation not only does not replicate the results evident in
the data, but also fails to generate predictions consistent with the model itself. Meanwhile, by
extending the model to include agency costs and a richer specification of the money demand
function, one can replicate the results evident in the data reasonably well and generate
predictions consistent with economic theory.
4.4 Conclusion
Over the last several years, the baseline New Keynesian model has been widely used to
examine monetary policy either in and of itself or at the core of a larger model specification.
This model has gained popularity largely as a result of the fact that it represents a micro-
founded, optimization-based, dynamic representation of the familiar IS-LM analysis. As
such the model has desirable and familiar properties.
Given the frequent use of the baseline New Keynesian framework for monetary policy
analysis, it is important to examine the properties of the model in order to determine the
model’s usefulness for completing such a task. Specifically, the New Keynesian framework
makes important assumptions about the transmission of monetary shocks. In particular,
this framework implies that the short-term interest rate set by the central bank sufficiently
captures the monetary transmission process. This view is at odds with the literature on the
credit channel as well as that of the monetarist literature.
In an effort to examine the assumptions about the monetary transmission mechanism
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embedded in the New Keynesian framework, this chapter extended the model to include
agency costs and a richer specification of the money demand function to compare the empir-
ical properties of each model to those observed in the data. The results show that the New
Keynesian model performs very poorly in capturing the second moments of the output gap,
inflation, and the interest rate. In addition, while the model does a good job replicating the
first- and second-order autocorrelations for inflation and the interest rate, the same cannot
be said for the autocorrelation properties of the output gap. In contrast, when extended to
include agency costs, the model is able to capture the second moments and the first- and
second-order autocorrelations observed in the data quite well.
What’s more, the analysis of aggregate demand suggests that the New Keynesian model
is poorly specified. Estimates of a backward-looking IS-type equation using U.S. data show
that detrended output has an autoregressive component, is negatively related to the central
bank’s short term interest rate target (albeit insignificantly when real balances are included),
and is positively related to real money balances. In contrast, estimates of the same equation
using data generated by the New Keynesian framework suggest that output is positively
related to the central bank’s interest rate. Estimates for the agency cost specification are
sensitive to the characteristics of the money demand functions. For example, when money
demand is static, as is standard in most New Keynesian analysis, the model is able to replicate
the autoregressive component of detrended output and the negative effect of movements in
the interest rate instrument. However, real money balances are not found to be statistically
significant. Nonetheless, when money demand is forward-looking, the agency cost model is
able to capture the positive and statistically significant relationship between output and real
money balances.
Overall, the New Keynesian model performs quite poorly in replicating the empirical
properties observed in the data. By extending the model to include agency costs, as em-
phasized by the credit channel literature, and a richer specification of money demand, long
emphasized by monetarists, the model employed in this chapter is much better able to repli-
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cate these empirical properties. These results would seem to suggest that the failures of the
New Keynesian framework are, at least in part, the result of strong assumptions regarding
the monetary transmission process. Given the wide dissemination of this framework for
monetary policy analysis, it would seem prudent to reconsider these assumptions in future
research.
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Chapter 5 Summary and Extensions
The basic New Keynesian model is the predominant framework for monetary policy
analysis in the literature. The model is a dynamic, optimization-based framework analogous
to the traditional IS-LM model. The model consists of three equations: (1) a dynamic IS
equation, (2) the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and (3) an interest rate rule for monetary
policy. As a result, the model makes a strong assumption about the monetary transmission
mechanism. Specifically, the model assumes that the transmission of monetary policy is
solely captured by the behavior of the short term interest rate.
In order to assess the validity of the assumption about the monetary transmission process,
this dissertation proposes two methods of analysis. First, the failure to identify a meaningful
role for monetary aggregates in the New Keynesian framework is built upon empirical results
that suggest the money demand is unstable as well as results which suggest that monetary
aggregates do not enter the IS equation. However, it is possible that these results are incorrect
due to the fact that they are based on the use flawed, simple sum measures of money. As
a result, the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 consists of a re-examination of these previous
results using the monetary services indexes available through the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, which are consistent with economic, aggregation, and index number theory. The
results suggest that the conclusions of earlier studies were biased due to mismeasurement.
The second method of analysis, presented in Chapter 4, extends the New Keynesian
model to include a richer specification of the money demand function and the inclusion of
agency costs to examine the implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. The
New Keynesian model remains nested within the new framework. The implications of each
addition to the basic model are contrasted with the New Keynesian model by computing
autocorrelation functions and standard deviations of the three core variables of the basic
framework as well as by estimating IS-type equations. The results suggest that the New
Keynesian model does a poor job of replicating empirical evidence.
Overall, this dissertation presents evidence that raises doubts about the assumptions
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of the basic New Keynesian model. Nonetheless, there remain important areas for future
research. First, in the model presented above, the demand for money is characterized by a
demand for the monetary aggregate itself. However, it should be noted that a key insight
of the derivation of the monetary services indexes is that there is a unique demand function
for each component of the monetary aggregate. An alternative and important extension
of the New Keynesian model would be to incorporate the demand for each asset within
the monetary aggregate in order to compare the results with those presented in Chapter 3.
Research using such extensions have only recently begun (Belongia and Ireland [2010]) and
focus on different metrics of performance than those presented in this dissertation.
A second area for future research would be to identify a solid theoretical foundation to
explain why the monetary services indexes perform better than the simple sum counterparts
beyond the simple explanation of mismeasurement. As noted by McCallum [1993], the failure
to identify a cointegrating relationship does not necessarily imply the absence of a stable,
long-run money demand function. For example, since the demand for money is based on the
idea that money is necessary to facilitate transactions, it is likely that the disturbance in the
money demand function follows a random walk due to changes in transactions technology.
The fact that one is able to identify a stable cointegrating relationship for the monetary
services indexes across samples begs the question as to why McCallum’s criticism seemingly
does not apply to these indexes. One possible reason is the transactions technology is likely
to alter the demand for certain assets within a given aggregate. Since the monetary services
index captures the changes in the yield and the price of each asset, it is possible that these
indexes are able to circumvent the criticism levied by McCallum by implicitly capturing of
these substitution effects. Nonetheless, a more solid theoretical foundation is necessary.
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APPENDIX 1: UNIT ROOT AND
COINTEGRATION TESTS
Table A1: Unit Root Tests
Variable t-statistic
Real MSI M1 -0.81
Real MSI M2 -0.71
Real MSI MZM -0.16
Price Dual M1 -1.88
Price Dual M2 -1.79
Price Dual MZM -1.79
Real Final Sales -1.54
Sig. level – 1%: -3.467 , 5%: -2.876 , 10% -2.575
Table A2: Trace Statistics
1960 - 1979:3 1979:4 - 2005
MSI M1 37.92 40.67
9.05 13.99
3.30 3.55
MSI M2 30.56 44.25
10.77 14.58
1.31 5.46
MSI MZM 29.09 34.39
10.15 8.32
1.50 2.57
M1 34.44 39.18
14.83 12.10
4.69 2.38
M2 36.50 37.08
11.11 10.05
3.45 3.31
MZM 31.30 27.25
11.31 10.88
2.53 3.30
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APPENDIX 2: THE COMPLETE DSGE MODEL
Household
The household chooses consumption, Ct, nominal money balances, Mt, and two types of
labor, Lt and Ut, nominal bond holdings, Bt, and the number of shares of the intermediate
goods producing firm, et, to maximize utility:
71
U(C,L, u,m) = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
C1−σt
1− σ −
L1+θt
1 + θ
− u
1+θ
t
1 + θ
+
m1−mt
1− m −
ϕm
2
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)2}
subject to
wtLt + rtut + (1 +Rt−1)bt−1 +mt−1 + et−1(qt + dt) = ct + bt +mt + qtet
where ϕm is a parameter that measures the cost of portfolio adjustment, β is the discount
factor, Pt is the price level, mt = Mt/Pt is real money balances, wt is the real wage, rt is
the real cost of ut, qt is the real price of a share of the intermediate goods firm, dt is the
real dividend earned from holding a share, bt = Bt/Pt, and R is the nominal interest rate on
bond holdings.
Constrained maximization yields the following:
λt = C
−σ
t (A1)
Lθt = λtwt (A2)
uθt = λtrt (A3)
m−mt − ϕm
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)
1
mt−1
− ϕm
(
mt
mt−1
− 1
)
mt+1
m2t
+ βEt
λt+1
pit+1
= λt (A4)
71The supply of shares is normalized to unity in equilibrium.
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βEt
λt+1
pit+1
(1 +Rt) = λt (A5)
βEtλt+1(qt+1 + dt+1) = λtqt (A6)
Solving to eliminate the Langrangian multiplier yields two labor supply curves, a money
demand function, a dynamic IS equation, and an asset demand function.
Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur uses two types of labor, L and u, to produce good x
and sells the good for price p. The entrepreneur earns profits from production to purchase
shares of the intermediate goods producing firm and for consumption. The entrepreneur
thus solves two problems – a profit-maximization problem and a utility maximization prob-
lem. This differs from the model used by Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2010) as that
model imposes the assumption that a fraction of entrepreneurs die each period and, as a
result, entrepreneurial consumption is zero in equilibrium. This assumption assures that
the collateral constraint is binding. Unfortunately, this limits the effects of agency costs
to fluctuations in asset prices and net worth and thus fails to differentiate the dynamics of
the model from a baseline New Keynesian model.72 This model adopts the assumption that
entrepreneurs have a higher discount rate than the representative household. This ensures
that the collateral constraint is binding and that entrepreneurial consumption is non-zero in
equilibrium.
Entrepreneurial Production
The entrepreneur produces output using the following production function:
xt = L
α
t u
1−α
t
72It does generate important differences in welfare. Since the previous authors were conducting welfare
analysis for alternate monetary policy rules, the assumption in this paper would have unnecessarily compli-
cated their analysis.
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and purchases quantities of each type of labor from the household in competitive markets.
The entrepreneur thus chooses Lt and ut to maximize profits given by:
Profits = ptxt − rtut − wtLt (A7)
where the choice of labor is made subject to the collateral constraint:73
wtLt ≤ g(nwt, ptxt − rtut) ≡ nwbt (ptxt − rtut)1−b (A8)
Where nwt = et−1(qt+ dt) is entrepreneurial net worth and (ptxt− rtut) are profits obtained
without the use of the L-type of labor. The collateral constraint implies that the entrepreneur
backs up the wage agreement with L-type labor suppliers with his net worth and the profits
from using the u-type of labor.
Maximizing (A7) in which equation (A8) is a binding constraint for the choice of L yields
the following optimization conditions:
rtut = (1− α)ptxt (A9)
wtLt = αptxt
(
1 + φtg2
1 + φt
)
(A10)
where φt is the Lagrangian multiplier and g2 is the partial derivative of g with respect to the
second argument.
Re-arranging equation (A9) yields:
ptxt − rtut = αptxt
73Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian show that this collateral constraint is isomorphic to the costly state
verification framework used in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998).
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Plugging this and equation (A10) into the profits equation gives:
Profits = αptxt − αptxt
(
1 + φtg2
1 + φt
)
= αptxt
(
1− 1 + φtg2
1 + φt
)
= αptxt
(
φt − φtg2
1 + φt
)
(A11)
Equivalently, if the collateral constraint is binding, one can write:
Profits = ptxt − rtut − wtLt = αptxt − g
Given that g2 = (1− b)nwbt (ptxt − rtut)−b and ptxt − rtut = αptxt, g can be written:
g = αptxt
g2
1− b
Thus,
Profits = αptxt
(
1− b− g2
1− b
)
(A12)
Equations (A11) and (A12) imply:
(
φt − φtg2
1 + φt
)
=
(
1− b− g2
1− b
)
Solving for g2:
g2 =
(
1− b
1 + bφt
)
Plugging this in to equation (A10) gives:
wtLt(1 + bφt) = αptxt (A13)
The optimization conditions reveal the credit distortion. Formally, equation (A13) is isomor-
phic to a model in which the wage, wt must be paid in advance of production in which bφt is
the real interest cost of an intratemporal loan. Thus, in comparison to a model without the
credit constraint, bφt represents a credit distortion on the loan. To understand this further,
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re-write equation (A13):
(1 + bφt) =
αptxt
wtLt
If the collateral constraint binds, one can substitute for wtLt:
(1 + bφt) =
αptxt
nwbt (ptxt − rtut)1−b
Equation (A9) implies that ptxt − rtut = αptxt. Thus,
bφt =
(
αptxt
nwt
)b
− 1
where the credit distortion is now expressed in terms of the output-net worth ratio where
the elasticity of the credit distortion to this ratio is given by b.
Finally, the existence of the collateral constraint implies that the entrepreneur will earn
a profit. Substituting the above optimization conditions into equation (A7) yields:
Profits = ptxt − rtut − wtLt = αptxt −
(
αptxt
1 + bφt
)
= αptxt
(
bφt
1 + bφt
)
Entrepreneurial Consumption
The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is given by:
cet + etqt = et−1(qt + dt) + profits (A14)
Using the expression for entrepreneurial profits and the fact that nwt = et−1(qt+dt), we can
re-write the budget constraint as:
cet + etqt = nwt + αptxt
(
bφt
1 + bφt
)
(A15)
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From the optimization conditions and the collateral constraint:
αptxt(1 + bφt)
−1 = wtLt = nwbt (ptxt − rtut)1−b
Using the optimality condition for labor type u in which ptxt − rtut = αptxt, this can be
re-written:
αptxt
(1 + bφt)
= nwbt (αptxt)
1−b
Solving for nwt yields:
nwt = αptxt
(
1
1 + bφt
) 1
b
Substituting this into (A15) gives:
cet + etqt = αptxtF (φt) (A16)
where:
F (φt) =
[(
bφt
1 + bφt
)
+
(
1
1 + bφt
) 1
b
]
The entrepreneur then chooses consumption, ce, and the fraction of shares, e, to maximize
utility:74
U(ce) = Et
∞∑
t=0
(βγ)tcet
subject to the budget constraint above. Here, γ is an additional discount factor that ensures
that the collateral constraint is binding. Constrained maximization yields the entrepreneur’s
intertemporal Euler equation:
qt = βγEt(qt+1 + dt+1)(1 + bφt+1) (A17)
74The additional discount factor γ ensures that the collateral constraint is binding.
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Firms
Final Goods Producing Firm
The final good producing firm is perfectly competitive and produces, yt. The firm pur-
chases yt(j) units from firm j ∈ [0, 1] at price Pt(j). The final good is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate of intermediate goods:
yt =
[ ∫ 1
0
yt(j)
(ε−1)/εdj
]ε/(ε−1)
(A18)
where −ε is the price elasticity of demand for yt(j).
The final goods producing firm maximizes profits:
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)yt(j)dj (A19)
subject to (A18). This gives the following demand function for the each intermediate good:
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
yt (A20)
Since the final goods producing firm is perfectly competitive it earns zero profits. Thus,
combining (A20) and (A19), yields the price index:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−εdj
]1/(1−ε)
Intermediate Goods Producing Firm
The intermediate good producing firm is monopolistically competitive and purchases a
quantity of the entrepreneurial good xt(j) in a perfectly competitive market at price pt from
the entrepreneur and combine technology, at to produce yt(j).
75 Under cost minimization,
75Where xt =
∫ 1
0
xt(j)dj
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the firm would thus choose xt(j) to minimize:
ptxt(j) (A21)
subject to:
yt(j) = atxt(j) (A22)
The first order condition is given by:
pt = ztat (A23)
where zt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Substituting this into (A21) yields:
ztyt(j)
where the Lagrangian multiplier can now be interpreted as the real marginal cost.
The intermediate goods producing firm is monopolistically competitive and chooses its
price. However, there is a cost of adjusting the price when the change differs from the steady
state inflation rate. Formally, this is based on Rotemberg’s (1982) quadratic cost of nominal
price adjustment and expressed in terms of final output:
ϕp
2
(
Pt(j)
piPt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
where ϕp measures the size of the price adjustment cost. Higher values of ϕp indicate greater
price stickiness.
The intermediate goods firm seeks to maximize the real present discounted marginal
utility value of the dividend that it pays out from its profits:
Et
[ ∞∑
i=0
βiλt+i
Dt+i(j)
Pt+j
]
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where the real value of the dividend is given by;
Dt(j)
Pt
=
Pt(j)
Pt
yt(j)− ztyt(j)− ϕp
2
(
Pt(j)
piPt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
Using this definition of the value of the dividend as well as the demand for yt given by
(A20), the intermediate goods producing firm chooses its price Pt(j) to solve the following
unconstrained maximization model:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiλt+i
[(
Pt+i(j)
Pt+i
)1−ε
yt+i− zt+i
(
Pt+i(j)
Pt+i
)−ε
yt+i− ϕp
2
(
Pt+i(j)
piPt+i−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt+i
]
(A24)
Maximization yields the following first-order condition:
(1− ε)λt
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε(
yt
Pt
)
+ ελtzt
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε−1(
yt
Pt
)
− ϕpλt
(
Pt(j)
piPt−1(j)
− 1
)(
yt
piPt−1(j)
)
+
βϕpEt
[
λt+1
(
Pt+1(j)
piPt(j)
− 1
)(
Pt+1(j)yt+1
piPt(j)2
)]
= 0
In equilibrium, zt and yt are the same for all intermediate goods firms and Pt(j) = Pt.
Thus, defining pit = Pt/Pt−1, and multiplying the first-order condition by pt/yt, it can be
re-written as:
(1− ε)λt+ ελtzt−ϕp
(
pit
pi
− 1
)(
pit
pi
)
+βϕpEt
[
λt+1
(
pit+1
pi
− 1
)(
pit+1
pi
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
= 0 (A25)
Equation (A25) is the marginal cost version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The firm is monopolistically competitive and, as such, earns a profit. It uses the profit
to pay a dividend to shareholders given, in real terms, by:
dt = atxt(1− zt) (A26)
Technology, at, used by the intermediate goods firm is exogenous and is expressed in
log-deviations by:
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + νˆat
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where νa is the technology shock.
Natural Rate of Output
The natural rate of output is defined to be the level of output that would exist in the
absence of price and credit frictions. As a result, in log deviations this is defined as:76
yˆnt =
(
1 + θ
σ + θ
)
aˆt
Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a Taylor rule. This is expressed
in log-deviations as:
Rˆt = φpipˆit + φy˜ ˆ˜y + ˆ
R
t (A27)
where R is the nominal interest rate, pi is the inflation rate, y˜ is the output gap, and R is
the monetary shock with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.4.
Closing the Model
In equilibrium, yt(j) = yt, Pt(j) = Pt, xt(j) = xt.
The model is then closed by the goods market equilibrium:
yt = ct + c
e
t
76The derivation is shown in section 4.4 below.
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Steady State
Output Shares
From the entrepreneur’s budget constraint,
ce = αpxF − eq
using the steady state condition given by equation (A23), this can be re-written:
ce
y
= αzF − eq
y
= αzF − e q
x
From (A6),
q =
β
1− βd
Thus,
ce
y
= αzF − e β
1− β
d
x
From (A26),
d
x
= 1− z
and from (A25),
z =
ε− 1
ε
Thus,
ce
y
= α
ε− 1
ε
F − e β
1− β
1
ε
Finally, from the goods market clearing equation:
c
y
= 1− c
e
y
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The Entrepreneur’s Discount Factor
The additional discount factor can be found by using equation (A6) and equation (A17):
q = β(q + d)
q = βγ(q + d)(1 + bφss)
Setting these equal and solving for γ:
1
(1 + bφss)
= γ
The parameterization of the model suggests that γ = .974. This is consistent with that of
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
Log-linearized System of Equations
The Household
Log-linearization of equation (A1) yields:
λˆ = −σcˆt
Log-linearizing (A2), (A3), (A4), (A5), and (A6) and substituting the above condition yields:
σcˆt + θLˆt − wˆt = 0 (A28)
σcˆt + θuˆt − rˆt = 0 (A29)
mˆt − σ
m
cˆt +
1
m
Rt + am∆mˆt = βamEt∆mˆt+1 (A30)
Rˆt + σcˆt = σEtcˆt+1 + Etpˆit+1 (A31)
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qˆt − σcˆt = βEtqˆt+1 + (1− β)Etdˆt+1 − σEtcˆt+1 (A32)
The Entrepreneur
Using the fact that pt = ztat, log-linearization of the input demand curves given by
equations (A13) and (A9) yields:
zˆt + yˆt − wˆt − Lˆt − bφˆt = 0 (A33)
zˆt + yˆt − rˆt − uˆt = 0 (A34)
Log-linearizing the collateral constraint given by equation (A8) yields:
beˆt−1 + bβqˆt + b(1− β)dˆt + (1− b)zˆt + (1− b)yˆt − wˆt − Lˆt = 0 (A35)
Log-linearization of the entrepreneurial budget constraint [equation (A16)]:
ce
αzyF
cˆet +
eq
αzyF
eˆt +
eq
αzyF
qˆt − zˆt − yˆt − (b− 1)φˆt = 0 (A36)
Log-linearization of the entrepreneurial consumption Euler equation [equation (A17)]:
qˆt = βEtqˆt+1 + (1− β)Etdˆt+1 + bφssEtφˆt+1 (A37)
The Intermediate Goods Firm
Log-linearization of the production function:
yˆt − aˆt − αLˆt − (1− α)uˆt = 0 (A38)
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Log-linearization of the Phillips curve given in equation (A25):
pˆit −
(
ε− 1
ϕp
)
zˆt = βEtpˆit+1 (A39)
Finally, the dividend in equation (A26) is given by:
dˆt − yˆt + (ε− 1)zˆt = 0 (A40)
Closing the Model
An identity defining the change in real balances gives:
∆mˆt − mˆt + mˆt+1 = 0 (A41)
The goods market is closed by:
yˆt −
(
c
y
)
cˆt −
(
ce
y
)
cˆet = 0 (A42)
The output gap is given by:
ˆ˜yt − yˆt +
(
1 + θ
σ + θ
)
aˆt = 0 (A43)
Together with the monetary policy rule given in equation (A27), equations (A28) - (A43)
are sufficient to solve for cˆt, Lˆt, wˆt, uˆt, rˆt, Rˆt, pˆit, qˆt, dˆt, cˆ
e
t , eˆt, zˆt, yˆt, ˆ˜y, φˆt, mˆt, and ∆mˆt.
The Model Solution
The model can be expressed as a singular linear difference model:
AEtYt+1 = BYt + CXt
Xt = ρXt−1 +Giet
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where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, A,
B, and C are matrices that contain the parameter values that correspond to the relations
between the variables described in the model above, ρ is the matrix that details the dynamic
behavior of the exogenous variables, et is a vector of innovations.
Using King and Watson’s (2002) system reduction algorithm, the solution to the model
can be expressed in state space form as:
Zt = ΠSt
where
St+1 =MSt +Gt
where Zt = [Yt, Xt]
′ and S is a vector of state variables.
This framework is useful as it is straightforward for simulation, impulse response func-
tions, and population moment calculations (as shown in King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 2001).
The Money Demand Function
Recall the money demand function in the model with portfolio adjustment costs:
mˆt − βamEt∆mˆt+1 + am∆mˆt = σ
m
cˆt − 1
m
Rt
First, it is important to note that when portfolio costs are zero, am = 0, and the money
demand curve reduces to
mˆt =
σ
m
cˆt − 1
m
Rt
which is the standard money demand function found in the literature.
Second, the money demand function derived from the portfolio adjustment cost speci-
fication can be re-written (henceforth suppressing the expectations operator and the hat-
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symbol):
mt − βammt+1 + βammt + ammt − ammt−1 = At
where A is given by the right-hand side of the original equation. Re-arranging:
mt+1 − (1 + βam + am)
βam
mt +
1
β
mt−1 = −(βam)−1At
or [
1− (1 + βam + am)
βam
L+
1
β
L2
]
mt+1 = −(βam)−1At
where L is the lag operator.
Factoring and multiplying both sides by the lag operator L yields:
(1− µ1L)(1− µ2L)mt = −(βam)−1At−1
where
µ1 + µ2 =
(1 + βam + am)
βam
and
µ1µ2 =
1
β
where µ1 is a stable root and µ2 is an unstable root.
Following Sargent (1987), one can solve the model forward to eliminate the unstable root:
(1− µ1L)mt = −(βam)
−1At−1
(1− µ2L)
where (1− µ2L) can be re-written:
(1− µ2L)−1 = −(µ2L)
−1
1− (µ2)−1 = −
∞∑
i=0
(µ2L)
−(i+1)
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Thus,
(1− µ1L)mt =
∞∑
i=0
(µ2L)
−(i+1)[(βam)−1At−1]
Substituting for A and re-arranging:
mt = µ1mt−1 + (βam)−1
[ ∞∑
i=0
(µ2)
−(i+1)
(
σ
m
ct+i − 1
m
Rt+i
)]
Thus, the money demand function utilized in this paper can be viewed as one in which
the demand for real balances is a function of permanent income and the long term interest
rate.
Simplifying the Model
The model can be simplified to the baseline New Keynesian model by setting α = 0.
Doing so eliminates the choice of L and thus the collateral constraint. The analysis can
therefore be confined to the household and the firms and exclude the entrepreneur. The
elimination of the entrepreneur implies that:
yt = ct
Thus, substituting the above condition and subtracting ynt from both sides, equation (A31)
can be re-written:
ˆ˜yt = Et ˆ˜yt+1 − 1
σ
(Rˆt − Etpˆit+1) (A44)
which is the standard IS equation used in the New Keynesian framework.
Also, the real marginal cost facing the intermediate goods producing firm can now be
derived by minimizing:
rtut(j)
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subject to:
yt(j) = atut
Constrained minimization yields:
zt =
rt
at
or in log-deviations:
zˆt = rˆt − aˆt
Substituting rˆt from the household problem yields:
zˆt = σyˆt + θuˆt − aˆt
Substituting the ut from the production function yields:
zˆt = σyˆt + θ(yˆt − aˆt)− aˆt (A45)
In the absence of price adjustment costs and agency costs, the real marginal cost, zt is
constant. Thus, in log-deviations, zˆt = 0 and yˆt = yˆ
n
t . Re-arranging yields:
yˆnt =
(
θ + 1
σ + θ
)
aˆt
which is the definition stated above.
To further simplify the matter, however, one can reduce the model further. Specifically,
in the sticky price model zˆt in equation (A45) can be re-written as:
zˆt = (σ + θ)yˆ
n
t − (θ + 1)aˆt (A46)
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Subtraction (A46) from (A45) yields the real marginal cost in terms of the output gap:
zˆt = (σ + θ)(yˆ − yˆnt )
where yˆt − yˆnt = ˆ˜yt
This latter expression of real marginal cost can then be substituted in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve given in equation (A39) to express the NK Phillips curve in terms of the output
gap:
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + κy˜
where κ =
(
ε−1
ϕp
)
(σ + θ).
The Phillips curve above together with equation (A44) and the monetary rule specified
in equation (A27) make up the baseline New Keynesian framework.
Finally, the New Keynesian model used in this paper employs two versions of the money
demand function. The first is that given in equation (A30). The second sets the parameter
am = 0 in equation (A30) such that:
mˆt − σ
m
yˆt +
1
m
Rt = 0
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APPENDIX 3: SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS
As shown in Figure 16 in Chapter 4, the baseline New Keynesian model is able to capture
the persistence of inflation quite well when the model is confined to two exogenous shocks:
monetary and technology. These results are contrary to those presented in Estrella and
Fuhrer (2002) for what is essentially the same structural model. The primary difference
between that model and the baseline New Keynesian model employed in the present analysis
is that the former includes an IS shock of the form:
εISt = 0.3ε
IS
t−1 + vt
where Etvt = 0 and SD(vt) = 0.01. (Estrella and Fuhrer assume that the IS shock is i.i.d.
However, the model that it is based on – McCallum and Nelson [1999] – uses the specification
above). To examine whether this difference is enough to explain the conflicting results, the
baseline New Keynesian model is extended to include the IS shock as articulated above. The
autocorrelation function for inflation generated by the model with the additional exogenous
variable is plotted below along with that of the standard model employed in the paper and
the autocorrelation function from the data. As in the paper, standard error bands are shown
by the dotted line.
As seen in the figure, the extension of the model to include the IS shock significantly
weakens the persistence of inflation. In fact, the entire autocorrelation function is outside
of the standard error bands. Thus, it seems that the absence of the IS shock is sufficient to
explain the differing results.
Figures A2 and A3 plot impulse response functions. Specifically, Figure A2 plots the
impulse response function for a monetary shock for the inflation and the output gap, respec-
tively, in each model. As noted in the footnote in the text, the agency cost model exhibits a
larger response to a change in monetary policy. As with the results for the autocorrelation
functions, the increased responsiveness and persistence is due to the effects of monetary
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policy not only on the nominal interest rate, but also on net worth. Figure A3 plots the
impulse response functions for the agency cost model.
Finally, Tables A3 and A4 examine the sensitivity of the results presented in Chapter 4
to the calibration of the model. The numbers in bold in the left-hand column denote the
actual calibration of the model. As shown, the results are not sensitive to the particular
calibration used in Chapter 4.
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Figure A1: Autocorrelation Functions
Figure A2: Impulse Response Function Comparison
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Figure A3: Monetary Shock – Agency Cost Model
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Table A3: Standard Deviations (in %)
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate
1954:3 - 2009:4 2.46 2.22 3.36
1979:4 - 2009:4 2.30 1.71 3.81
b = 0.2 2.52 2.29 2.18
b = 0.4 2.50 2.29 2.19
b = 0.67 2.46 2.29 2.21
e = 0.04 2.52 2.29 2.18
e = 0.01 2.15 1.79 1.62
α = 0.5 2.52 2.29 2.18
α = 0.25 2.75 2.51 2.4
α = 0.1 2.85 2.6 2.49
Monetary Policy
Standard Taylor rule (1.5, .5)
Agency Cost 2.52 2.29 2.18
NK 0.14 0.18 0.32
Clarida, Gal´ı, Gertler (2.15, 0.93)
Agency Cost 2.60 2.02 1.94
NK 0.10 0.09 0.23
Judd-Rudebusch (1.54, 0.99)
Agency Cost 2.03 3.32 3.11
NK 0.11 0.14 0.28
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Table A4: First- and Second-order Autocorrelations
Output Gap Inflation Interest Rate
1954:3 - 2009:4 0.92 0.97 0.95
0.79 0.93 0.88
1979:4 - 2009:4 0.93 0.84 0.94
0.81 0.66 0.87
Agency Cost Model
b = 0.2 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
b = 0.4 0.92 0.95 0.95
0.86 0.90 0.91
b = 0.67 0.93 0.94 0.95
0.88 0.90 0.90
e = 0.04 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
e = 0.01 0.91 0.93 0.94
0.83 0.86 0.88
α = 0.5 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
α = 0.25 0.94 0.95 0.95
0.88 0.90 0.91
α = 0.1 0.94 0.95 0.95
0.89 0.90 0.90
Monetary Policy
Standard Taylor Rule (1.5, 0.5)
Agency Cost Model 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
NK Model 0.52 0.94 0.89
0.32 0.88 0.81
Clarida, Gal´ı, Gertler (2.15, 0.93)
Agency Cost Model 0.94 0.94 0.95
0.88 0.89 0.90
NK Model 0.46 0.92 0.88
0.24 0.86 0.81
Judd-Rudebusch (1.54, 0.99)
Agency Cost Model 0.93 0.95 0.95
0.87 0.90 0.91
NK Model 0.52 0.94 0.90
0.32 0.88 0.83
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